Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1996

The Legal Structure of the Chinese Socialist Market Enterprise
William H. Simon
Columbia Law School, wsimon@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William H. Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese Socialist Market Enterprise, 21 J. CORP. L. 267
(1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3652

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

The Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market"
Enterprise
William H. Simon*
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .

267

II. THE ENTERPRISE MODELS OF THE 1980s ......................... 270
A. State-Owned Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
B. Township and Village Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
III. CORPORATIZATION . . . . • . . . . . • • . • . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . • . . . . • . . . . • • 285

A. State-Owned Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
B. Township and Village Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
IV.

THE ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIALIST MARKET ENTERPRISE . . . • 297
A. Authority: Governance and Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
B. Exit Constraints and Enterprise Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • . • • . • . • . . . . • . . . . . . • . • . . . .

305

I. INTRODUCTION
China's phenomenal economic growth since 1978 has been accompanied by a cascade of institutional innovation and experimentation. In at least this one sense a hundred
flowers are blooming in the People's Republic. The range of institutional forms and
their defiance of the conventions of economic organization in both capitalist and socialist societies are impressive.
The Chinese leadership calls the new order by the unfamiliar (and to some,
oxymoronic) term "socialist market" economy. 1 Its "market" dimensions include dereg-

* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford University. My research
in China was supported by the George Roberts Fund for Research in Law and Business at Stanford.
As an amateur on Chinese matters, I have depended on the help of friends and colleagues. I am especially grateful to Carmen Chang, Yingyi Qian, Zheyuen Cui, Dandan Chen, Lawrence Liu, Changchun Yuen,
Minx.in Pei, Frankie Leung, Jim Bass, Louis Putterman, and many residents of the People's Republic of China
whom custom and prudence preclude me from identifying. In addition to providing information and clarification on many matters, Yuen read and translated Chinese materials for me, and Cui, Qian, and Pei let me see
their brilliant unpublished work on which I have relied extensively. I also received help from participants at a
Stanford faculty seminar and a meeting of the NBSM Group, especially Eric Wright and Pranab Bardhan.
Note on sources: Except for generally known background facts and statements cited to published sources below, the assertions of this article are based on discussions with officials and academics in Beijing in
August 1993 and August 1994, and in Shanghai in October 1995 at a conference organized by On Kit Tam.
I. Prior to 1992, the official term was "socialist commodity" economy. Another popular term is "socialism with Chinese characteristics."
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ulation of most prices, decentralization of decision-making to the household in agriculture and to the enterprise in industry, incentive schemes for peasants, managers, and
workers, and encouragement or tolerance of domestic private ownership in small business and various kinds of foreign investment. At the same time, the leadership considers
the economy a "socialist" one in which "public ownership constitutes the mainstay."2
Despite the important growth of private enterprise and foreign investment, the great
bulk of industrial production occurs under public ownership.
Public industrial production takes place in two distinct sectors. First, the StateOwned Enterprises (SOEs) are typically urban, large-scale, mostly capital-intensive
industries controlled at the national, provincial, and county levels. Second, the collective
sector consists of relatively labor intensive industries subject to local governments, and
is in tum conventionally divided into urban and rural subsectors.
Each of these sectors has been transformed during the reform period, with varying
degrees of success. From one-third to one-half of the SOEs have become self-sustaining
in a competitive market environment, and the most successful hav.e achieved formidable
productivity and growth. On the other hand, at least one-third of these enterprises survive only through exorbitant government subsidies. In the rural part of the collective
sector, the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), which get little subsidy, have, in
the aggregate, achieved astounding success and have proved the most dynamic sector of
the economy. From the early 1980s, while the annual growth rate for the economy as a
whole has averaged a breath-taking nine percent, TVE production has grown at the rate
of twenty-five percent.3 These developments, especially in the TVE sector, have
prompted many (including some for whom the wish is not father to the thought) to
question the neo-liberal dogma that privatization is necessary for successful reform of
state socialist economies. 4
Each sector has developed a distinctive and in some respects novel set of institutional forms. Indeed, the economist Ronald McKinnon has called the TVEs "a form of
corporate organization that has not been created before."5 To call these structures "legal" begs several questions of comparative jurisprudence, but there are some salient
reasons for doing so. The reform of the Chinese economy has been accompanied by the
emergence of a legal system designed both to protect the independence of enterprises
and facilitate their regulation. To a limited extent the enterprises are the product of

2. Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist
Market Economic Sttucture, Daily Rep. China (FBIS), at 22, 23 (Nov. 17, 1993) [hereinafter Decision of the
CPC Central Committee].
3. The World Bank data put the average annual GNP growth from 1980 to 1993 at 9.6% and average
annual per capita GDP growth during this period at 8.2%. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REl'ORT
1995 162, 164 (1995); see also Martin Weitzman & Chenggan Xu, Chinese Township and Village Enterprises
as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. EcoN. 121, 128 (1994) (estimating TVE annual growth in output, capital productivity, and labor productivity from 1979 to 1991 at 25.3%, 16.5%, and 11.9%, respectively); Thomas G. Rawski, Progress Without Privatiz.ation: The Reform of China's State Industries, in CHANGING PoLmCAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES 27-52
(Vidat Milor ed., 1994) (documenting substantial productivity increases in many SOE sectors).
4. E.g., China: The Titan Stirs, EcONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 6-8.
5. Id. at 12.
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legislation. They have also been influenced by Western legal models of business organization.
On the other hand, China's effort to establish an independent judiciary is in an
early stage, and the leadership's commitment to the rule of law is ambiguous. To date
the courts have not been extensively involved in intra-enterprise disputes. The gap between legal prescription and practical enforcement is thus larger and less measurable
than in the West. Even if the enterprise laws were completely unenforced, they would
be of interest as ideological pronouncements, but ambiguity about the degree of enforcement makes assessment of their practical significance more speculative.
Aside from its intrinsic interest, an examination of the legal structure of these enterprises may offer some clues as to the broader meaning and longer term direction of
"socialism with Chinese characteristics." The leadership has made little effort to explain
or justify the reforms in terms of Communist or any other ideology. Sometimes it purports to have discovered a previously under-appreciated requirement in the logic of
historical materialism that full-scale socialism be preceded by a period of market relations of unspecified duration. Sometimes it speaks as if socialism amounted to nothing
more than an aspiration to maximize production by whatever institutions seemed likely
at the moment to do so. Deng Xiaoping's famous maxim of the 1960s-"It doesn't
matter whether the cat is black or white. If it catches mice, it's a good cat."--once
seemed a protest against dogmatism; today it seems an excuse for unprincipled expedience.6 Since there is little direct theorizing about the meaning of Chinese market socialism, the best way to study it is through more narrowly focused policy debates and the
reformers' practices. The effort to produce a legal framework for public enterprises is a
small but interesting comer of these activities.
Part II of this Article describes some of the legal ideas that emerged from efforts
during the 1980s to reform the SOEs and TVEs. In each case, reforms proceeded by
adopting features familiar to Western capitalist enterprise but retaining largely public
ownership and other significant features of pre-reform socialist enterprise models. Part
III discusses the more recent emergence of models based on Western corporate forms.
These corporate models, which are in the early stages of implementation, tend to dilute
the distinctively "Chinese characteristics" of the 1980s models but do not eliminate
them. In their more innovative and daring variations, the reforms promise to create two
distinctive structures of market socialism--one resonating with recent Western speculation on corporate governance through investment intermediaries and the other resonating
with recent Western speculation about industrial districts. These Western ideas, however, have been considerably less influential than a more conventional set of views about
the corporate form that has played a surprising and perhaps perverse role in the reforms.
Part IV speculates on the origins and prospects of public ownership and the other
distinctive "characteristics." One common expectation is that, barring a collapse into

6. HARRISON SALISBURY, THE NEW EMPERORS 209 (1992) (quoting Deng Xiaoping). On recent ideological developments, see generally DENG XIAOPING, BUILD SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
(1985); JOSEPH FEWSMITH, DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN CHINA: POLITICAL CONFLICT AND EcoNOMJC DEBATE
(1994); see also Alison W. Conner, To Get Rich Is Precarious: Regulation of Private Enterprise in the
People's Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 1, 9-16 (1991).
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anarchy or a reversion to totalitarianism, China's institutions, especially its industrial
enterprises, will converge with the dominant models of Western capitalism. The move
toward corporatization in both state and collective sectors could be read as confirming
that expectation. However, the move to corporatization may not be stable and the distinctive "characteristics" may prove durable even in a prosperous market environment.
II. THE ENTERPRISE MODELS OF THE 1980s
China has moved gradually but decisively to facilitate private enterprise. Nonetheless, most of the economy remains publicly owned.7 Moreover, official doctrine holds
that public ownership remains "the basis of the socialist economic system [of the
PRC]."8

The reforms have privatized many small enterprises, usually by sale or lease to
managers and workers. However, the leadership has insisted that the large state enterprises remain under public control. The leadership rejects large-scale privatization of the
sort occurring in Eastern Europe, in which state assets are auctioned to the wealthy or
given away to the masses, on several grounds. First, mass privatization would likely
produce an undesirable concentration of capital in private (especially foreign) hands.
Second, given the difficulties of valuing state assets, the dangers of shortchanging the
state are great. Third, the distributive and allocative consequences of stock trading by
masses of uninformed citizens in informationally inefficient markets are likely to be
undesirable. Insiders and speculators would grow rich at the expense of ordinary citizens, and the stock market would not play a useful role in corporate monitoring. Fourth,
China lacks a developed system of tax collection and the social conventions that support
it. At least until it can develop these things, the revenues of the state enterprises are the
most plausible form of government finance.
Moreover, despite the enthusiasm of many segments of the population for capitalist
institutions, private enterprise still lacks legitimacy in many quarters. Private enterprise
also lacks the legal protection it enjoys in the West. Thus, privatization is rejected not
only by those who oppose it on ideological and political grounds, but also by cadres
and managers who feel that they can get rich more safely at the helm of a public, rather
than a private, enterprise.
In. the tradition of most Communist legal systems, China continues to distinguish
between two types of public ownership. "State ownership," which in Chinese jargon is
synonymous with "ownership by the whole people," gives ultimate control to the central
government (though many state enterprises are assigned conditionally to provinces or
counties). "Collective ownership" involves association with lower levels of government
and connotes, in theory, control over the enterprise by its participants.9

7. Official statistics for 1993 show 81 % of the gross value of industrial output coming from public
(state and collective) enterprises and less than 19% coming from private (individual and "other'') ones. They
show more than 90% of employment in public enterprises. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA 1994 351, 365
(1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1994].
8. XIANFA [Constitution] art. VI (P.R.C.) (1982).
9. See generally XIANFA [Constitution] arts. VI-VIII (P.R.C.) (1982). See also GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
C1vn. LAW [GEN. PRINCIPLES CIV. L.] art. 48 (P.R.C.) (explaining that property of a state enterprise is "given
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The large-scale, capital-intensive, urban economy tends to take the form of SOEs.
There are between 100,000 and 200,000 of them. Many small-scale urban enterprises
and most rural enterprises have tended to take the form of collectives. Since the dramatic agricultural gains of the early reform years, the most dynamic growth has been in
rural industry-the "township and village enterprises." There are between one and two
million of them.
In both sectors, the reforms of the 1980s produced enterprise structures that combined familiar features of Western business institutions with features reflecting the prereform socialist economy. Aside from public ownership, perhaps the most distinctive of
these latter features are: First, the models express an ambiguous and perhaps paradoxical conception of enterprise governance that, in comparison to the formal Western corporate model, combines an exceptional degree of managerial power with an exceptional
degree of worker participation. Second, these models retain from the pre-reform era a
conception of the enterprise as a relatively encompassing community and the worker's
participation as a form of membership, as opposed to a narrowly contractual employment relation. Third, they presume or require a relatively high degree of internal finance
and income reinvestment.
A. State-Owned Enterprises
The PRC regime continues to portray "ownership by the whole people" as historically and economically the most advanced form of property and to see the SOEs as the
"leading sector" or "mainstay" of the economy.' 0 The ultimate representative of the
"whole people" is the national government. Nevertheless, the national government can
delegate to inferior jurisdictions. When it does so, the lower level government's rights
are a matter of national government discretion or intergovernmental contract; the national government retains some claims to the property, notably the right to resume control
or re-delegate to some other entity.
Chinese government has long been relatively decentralized and jurisdictionally
pluralistic. Thus, control of the SOEs has always been at various governmental levels.
"Property in China," Andrew Walder writes, "has never been held by 'the state'-it
always has been held by thousands of separate government jurisdictions, from villages
right up to the central ministries.""
The economic reforms dramatically increased the practice of downward delegation
of control over state enterprises. Upper level governments turned control of enterprises
to lower level governments in return for the latter's agreements to remit a share of tax
or profit collections. At the same time, governments at all levels created or enhanced
relatively autonomous entities to undertake investments. These included investment
companies, holding companies, foundations (akin to charitable corporations), and joint
ventures with foreign enterprises. At the same time, government service providers such
as schools, hospitals, and (most notoriously) prisons were encouraged to develop for-

it to manage" by the state; property of a collective is "owned" by the collective).
10. XIANFA [Constitution] art. VI (P.R.C.) ( 1982).
11. Andrew G. Walder, Corporate Organi;.ation and Local Government Property Rights in China, in
CHANGING PoLmCAL EcONOMIES, supra note 3, at 53, 58.
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profit sideline enterprises. The People's Liberation Army (PLA), which has always had
its own enterprise sector, became a major player in a variety of new investments, many
unconnected to its military mission.
Collaboration between different governmental entities created myriad joint ownership structures. For example, the Ministries of Finance and Commerce created the Commodities Investment Futures Corporation through a joint initiative. It provides trading
services for derivative securities. The Ministries of Finance and Commerce divide its
income and nominate its governing board. The Jinbei Passenger Vehicle Manufacturing
Company of Shenyang, initially entirely controlled by the Shenyang government, sold
minority interests to some of its suppliers, which were also SOEs (and eventually to the
public on the Shanghai stock exchange). When it recently created a joint venture (financed in part by a public offering in the United States), a major investor was the Chinese Financial Education Development Foundation, a "social" organization devoted to
"financial education and research" sponsored by the Bank of China and affiliated institutions.
The reforms of the 1980s revised the terms on which government would deal with
SOEs. The central government phased out price control and administrative allocation for
most goods. Under the "contract responsibility system" instituted throughout the 1980s,
governments at all levels gave enterprises subject to their control more latitude over
operating and even investment matters. They ceased claiming all the enterprises' operating profits, instead settling for a fixed payment alone or accompanied by a profit
share. 12
The initial major attempt to impose formal legal structure on SOE reform was the
Enterprise Law of 1988. 13 It is vague and fragmentary. Yet, the three distinctive
themes of the "socialist market" enterprise of this period are apparent.
Authority. The basic purpose of the "contract responsibility" system was to create
incentives to pursue profits and then give enterprises the autonomy to do so by restraining interference by government agencies. 14 The 1988 Enterprise Law reflects the autonomy goal in four prominent provisions. First, it proclaims the "principle of separation of ownership and control," which it then interprets to allow the enterprise to enjoy
the rights to "control, utilize, and dispose" of the enterprise assets. 15 Second, it makes
each enterprise a profit center that must "take responsibility for its own profits and losses."16 Third, it makes each enterprise an independent "legal person," connoting that the
enterprise can independently contract, convey property, and sue and be sued.' 7 Finally,

12. See generally SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE PoLITICAL LOGIC OF EcONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 149-330
(1993).
13. Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, Daily Rep. China (FBIS), at 42-49 (Apr.
26, 1988) [hereinafter Enterprise Law].
14. What constitutes objectionable "interference" as opposed to appropriate regulation has not always

been clear. Presumably general regulation to correct market failure and implement social goals remained legitimate. What was objectionable was the imposition of business judgments by government cadres and the making of unprincipled or ad hoc demands that the enterprise support social goals or simply make payments to
agencies or cadres.
15. Enterprise Law, supra note 13, art. 2.
16. Id.
11. Id.
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it gives the enterprise a series of control rights including the rights to make various
business decisions on matters of what to make, who to sell to at what price, and how to
invest retained earnings, as well as "the power to reject the exaction of its manpower,
materials and financial resources ... by any state agency." 18 The enterprise is given a
right of appeal from government orders it believes unlawful. 19 These provisions are
qualified by duties to safeguard the property of the enterprise, 20 and by an open-ended
right of the government to "issue unified mandatory plans for the enterprise" and to "remove, reward, or punish" the enterprise director. 21
Within the enterprise, the statute defines an extremely powerful managerial role. It
requires enterprises to implement "the factory director (manager) responsibility system,"
apparently a synonym for the "contract responsibility system," but one that emphasizes
the director's preeminence within the system. 22 The statute further provides that the
director "shall occupy the central position in the enterprise," 23 that the enterprise system of "production, operation and management [be] headed by the director," and that
the "factory director shall be the legal representative of the enterprise."24 A list of specific managerial powers includes powers "to decide on various plans for the enterprise,"
to appoint subordinate managers, and to reward and discipline subordinate managers
and workers. 25 The latter powers are qualified by powers of approval of the government
entities responsible for the enterprise. Viewed in isolation, these provisions suggest a
more powerful managerial role than can be found in any Western corporate statute.
However, these provisions co-exist with provisions on worker participation that are also
unusual by Western standards.
The PRC Constitution requires that "[s]tate enterprises practice democratic management through congresses of workers and staff and in other ways according to law."26
The Enterprise Law affirms the commitment to "democratic management" 27 and further declares that workers "enjoy the status of masters."28 This term is not immediately
defined, but later provisions are relevant, though also ambiguous. Two provisions suggest that the workers might have some role in choosing the director. One article gives
the workers' congress the power to "elect [the factory director], according to the decision of [i.e., with the approval of] the competent department of the government."29 The
other article provides that the director is to be elected either by appointment of the
responsible government agency or by election by the workers' congress that separate
legislation required all enterprises to establish. 30

18. Id. arts. 22-33.
19. Id. art. 61.
20. Enterprise Law, supra
21. Id. art. 55.
22. Id. art. 7.
23. Id. art. 44.
24. Id. art 45.
25. Enterprise Law, supra
26. XIANFA [Constitution]
27. Enterprise Law, supra
28. Id. art. 9.
29. Id. art. 52(5).
30. Id. art 44.

note 13, art. 61.

note 13, art. 45.
art. XVI (P.R.C.) (1982).
note 13, art. 49.
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Workers are to participate in management directly through the general assembly of
the workers' congress and in shop floor work teams, as well as through the representatives that the congress chooses.31 The powers of the workers' congress include "to hear
and deliberate [i.e., consider]" management's plans for all aspects of the enterprise, "to
examine and agree to or reject" management's plans regarding wages and working conditions," "to deliberate and decide" on housing and other welfare expenditures for the
workers, and to "appraise and supervise" managers "at various levels of the enterprise."
These powers, ambiguous in themselves, are made more so by the qualification that the
workers "support the factory director in exercising his functions." 32
Overall, these provisions suggest deliberate ambiguity. Depending on whether the
workers are allowed independently to elect the director and how the workers' power to
"deliberate," "supervise," and "approve or reject" are construed, the workers could have
strong participatory rights or very weak ones. In practice, most observers believe the
workers have weak participatory rights. Directors are generally appointed, usually by
the relevant branch of the Party Organization Department, and the ongoing role of the
workers' congresses is rarely strong. Even workers in the more financially successful
enterprises and who may have great respect for their bosses often believe that participation is a sham and that the reforms have increased the director's power relative to their
own. "He used to act like a director; now he acts like an owner," is a widely expressed
worker view about the evolution of authority under the reforms.
While unusual, meaningful worker control apparently has occurred. A few workers'
congresses have elected enterprise directors and have been active in management,
though there are no detailed reports on them. Some SOEs have used elaborate committee structures to involve workers in work design and allocation in a way that to outsiders might resemble collective bargaining. Thus, the main significance of the statutory
provisions is as an expression of a public aspiration toward workers' control, albeit a
qualified and ambiguous one.
Membership. In the pre-reform era, the state-owned enterprise was an encompassing community. It was the lowest level of a hierarchy of governance and social control
institutions, as well as a social welfare and insurance agency attending to a broad range
of consumption needs commonly including food, housing, and entertainment. The stateowned enterprise provided health and retirement benefits and perhaps education to its
workers and their families. Workers presumptively had lifelong tenure; indeed, for
many years they had the right to bequeath their jobs to their heirs. Although compensation practices varied over the years, they were always egalitarian by Western capitalist
standards. 33
During the reform era, however, the leadership has sought to move away from this
model toward a more conventional vision of employment referred to as "the contract
system."34 This model contemplates that workers will be subject to layoff after the
specified term of their employment contract. The vulnerability of individual employees

31. Id. art. 43.
32. Enterprise Law, supra note 13, art. 52.
33. See ANDREW G. WALDER, COMMUNIST NEO-TRADITIONALISM: WORK AND AUTHORITY IN CHINESE
INDUSTRY 28-84 (1986).
34. See HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 33-58 (1990).
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to discharge for redundancy complements the "contract responsibility system" notion
that the enterprise should be "responsible for its own profits and losses" and subject to
bankruptcy if it fails to achieve profitability. In addition, the "contract system" contemplates that the enterprise will shed responsibility for most housing and welfare functions, many of which will be left increasingly to the market, and for retirement and
disability benefits, which are to be taken up by general social insurance systems. Moreover, the system urges productivity-based compensation differentials.
In fact, the implementation of the new system has been slow and erratic, and, at
least de facto, the SOEs have retained three salient features of encompassing community-tenure, collective consumption, and internal egalitarianism. First, it has proved
politically impossible to harden the budget constraints of many state enterprises; layoffs
have been rare and bankruptcies rarer still. Moreover, the establishment of government
programs capable of assuming the social insurance functions of the SOEs has been
slow. Thus, the enterprises retain many of their welfare functions. The idea of presumptive tenure for workers in all except the more troubled enterprises is unlikely to be
abolished. Urban families have come to expect presumptive tenure, and it is a norm
espoused in many sectors of capitalist industry abroad. A self-respecting "market socialist" society would seemingly want to achieve at least this much. The 1994 Labor Law
makes tenure mandatory for workers who have been with the enterprise for ten years. 35
Second, the reformed enterprises have continued the SOE tradition of enterprisefocused collective consumption. Although the new consumer goods markets have reduced dependence on enterprises for such goods, enterprises continue to provide consumer goods to their workers. Moreover, the establishment of public social insurance
programs capable of assuming the SOEs' welfare functions have been slow, so the enterprises have continued to provide these benefits.
One explanation for the practice is that it facilitates evasion of the constraints on
wage dispersion. In-kind compensation is much more unequally distributed than cash
compensation. The successful enterprise director receives a small salary by Western
standards, but he also enjoys an expense-account life that approaches Western standards.
However, it seems likely as well that the practice of in-kind and collective compensation reflects a continuation of the expectation that the enterprise will concern itself with
the needs of its workers.
Enterprises set aside specified percentages of their profits in welfare funds that
fund consumption and social benefits. The 1992 regulations supplementing the Enterprise Law mandate that amounts equal to at least ten percent of any increase in total
wages be put in the welfare fund. 36 Provincial and city regulations contain additional
restrictions of this sort.
Third, there remains a high degree of internal egalitarianism in cash wage compensation. Senior executive salaries even in the more successful enterprises are typically no
more than three times the salaries of rank-and-file production workers. The constraints
on inequality are not mandated by the enterprise and labor law; 37 they result from poli-

35. Labor Law, an. 20 (State Council 1994) (P.R.C.).
36. Id. an. 24.
37. The 1992 regulations on "Changing the Operating Mechanism of Enterprises Owned by the Whole
People," which supplement the Enterprise Law, contain some restrictions on wages in articles 24 and 25, but

276

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

cies of the ministries and the party and presumably the continued power of egalitarian
ideals among the workforce. While there is considerable pressure toward widening the
differentials, it is hard to imagine them reaching the levels typical of the West.
Reinvestment. Successful SOEs reinvest a large fraction of their profits. When they
reach the limits of expansion of existing lines of business, they enter new ones, sometimes turning themselves into conglomerates. They often undertake joint ventures with
other enterprises. Purely passive investments, however, are rare.
Some state and municipal legislation mandates that a minimum fixed percentage of
profit be reinvested. The national legislation creates more indirect pressures and incentives toward the same general result. One such feature is a kind of "reinvestment tax
credit" that rebates a portion of tax payments on reinvested income. 38
The "contract responsibility" system reflected in the Enterprise Law creates a structure in which management (perhaps with the workers) has most aspects of control. The
state, however, remains the residual claimant on the firm's income. The state's residual
claim is qualified by what is effectively a profit-sharing arrangement in which management and workers receive bonus compensation based on performance.
There are two streams of money that the state, as the residual financial claimant,
might have been expected to appropriate. The first is that of depreciation funds. As in
the Western enterprise, some fraction of the firm's gross receipts are considered as a
recovery of the loss in value of its capital equipment incurred in producing the goods
that generated the income. The second cash stream, of course, is the profit stream. Instead of requiring these funds to be remitted to the state, the system gives management
full control over depreciation funds, which can be invested in the upkeep of existing
assets or the purchase of new ones, and it allows the enterprise to retain for reinvestment all profits in excess of a specified amount.
This structure represents a departure from the Communist system in which the
central government controlled both depreciation funds and enterprise surpluses. It bears
substantial resemblance to Western corporate structures in which managers often have
de facto control over such funds and have strong incentives to retain them in the enterprise. But in the Chinese case the incentives are stronger and more explicit. Managers are under a legal duty to reinvest depreciation funds, and the residual claimant is
committed not to demand pay out of more than a specified fraction of profits.
Of course, the reinvestment requirements are consistent with the policies and propensities reflected in China's phenomenal savings and investment rates, which have
exceeded a third of gross domestic product throughout most of the reform period. 39
But these policies do not explain the requirement that profits be reinvested in the enterprise (or affiliated ones). There seem to be two reasons for the strong commitment to
reinvestment. First, the state's commitment to allowing successful firms to grow gives
managers and workers incentives to work harder and to work with a perspective to the
long run success of the firm. Second, China does not have a fully developed system of

they are concerned with keeping wage increases in line with increases in profitability and labor productivity,
not internal dispersion. A detailed summary of the regulations appears at JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 14, 2122 (Oct. I 3, I 992).
38. Id. at 18-19.
39. WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 178; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1994, supra note 7, at tbl. 2-16.
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institutions-either in the form of government agencies or capital markets-to reallocate
income across firms. The state agencies are distrusted particularly as vehicles for investment decisions, and capital markets are undeveloped.

B. Township and Village Enterprises
From the late 1950s until the 1980s, government choked off private enterprise, but
it gave a significant role to collective ownership. Light industry in urban areas has been
commonly organized in the collective form. During the Great Leap Forward (1958-61)
and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), strenuous efforts were made to introduce smallscale industry into the countryside, and these nearly always took the collective form.
Outsiders have tended to view collectives as just as much creatures of the state as
the nominally state-owned enterprises. They have attributed the significance of the distinction between the two forms of ownership to two practical features different from the
ones emphasized in Communist theory. First, unlike the state-owned enterprises, the
collective ones were not included in the State Economic Plan and were not subject to
direct control at the central, provincial, or county levels. This meant that state control
was weaker and that it occurred at the local government level (districts or neighborhood
associations in cities, townships, and villages in the countryside). It also meant that, in
principle, collective property was not subject to reallocation by the central government. 40 Second, the package of welfare, health, and retirement benefits that the collectives were required to extend to their employees was much less generous than the one
guaranteed to state enterprise workers. 41
In Communist theory, however, the most important connotations of the collective
form were different, and while these theoretical connotations may not have had a great
deal of influence on practice prior to the reform period, they have been influential in
recent years and may prove more so in the future. 42 In theory, state ownership entitles
the state, on behalf of the society, both to control the enterprise and to appropriate the
residual returns from its operation. By contrast, under collective ownership both control
and the right to residual returns belong to the collective's members. This implies enterprise autonomy, self-management, and distribution of residual returns to members.
The members have ownership rights only collectively. These rights are not individually appropriable or transferable. The member cannot sell her rights; she cannot liquidate her anticipated future benefits into a present lump sum; and she cannot continue to
enjoy her rights after she has left the collective. At the same time, these rights are subject to strong accumulation restraints that typically mandate strict equality in control and
limited inequality in financial distribution.

40. Yingyi Qian has offered the following legal positivist elucidation of the distinction between state and
collective property: "The central government reserves the ultimate rights of reallocation of residual cash flow
and the assets in state-owned enterprises, even if the control rights have been delegated to and the residual
income has not been assigned to local governments, while it has no such rights [with respect to] collectivelyowned enterprises." Yingyi Qian, Issues of Enterprise Reform in China 3 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
41. WALDER, supra note 33, at 43-48.
42. See generally XUE MUQIAO, CHINA'S SOCIALIST EcONOMY 45-66 (1981).
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The members similarly cannot appropriate collective capital as a group by, for
example, agreeing to liquidate it and sharing the proceeds. In Western legal rhetoric,
they might be characterized as trustees of the enterprise's capital for future members.
The law requires that enterprise capital be maintained through depreciation charges (and
also frequently in China, augmented through mandatory earnings retention) and restricts
distributions to what American lawyers might call earned surplus.
Although the collective form often puzzles American observers of China (and of
Yugoslavia, where prior to 1988 it received its most ambitious implementation), there
are Western analogues to it. In its worker control and profit appropriation it resembles a
cooperative; in its restraints on capital appropriation it resembles a charitable trust. In
its combination of these features it resembles the "limited equity cooperative," a form
occasionally found in the United States in publicly subsidized housing ownership and in
worker cooperatives in Europe. 43
Although the collective form is fairly well-defined, a distinctive ambiguity recurs in
the usage of the term. Sometimes the Chinese speak as though each enterprise were
itself a collective and its workers, the member-owners. At other times, they speak as if
the local government units associated with the enterprise were the collectives and all the
members of these units were the owners of the associated enterprises. And in still other
instances, somewhat contradictorily, they refer to individual enterprises as collectives
"owned" by the government units.
Part of the ambiguity arises from the fact that, while urban districts and neighborhood associations and rural townships and villages perform governmental functions,
they are not considered part of the "state," but are themselves collectives. 44 Unlike
their urban counterparts, the townships and villages (and their predecessors, the communes and brigades) have played strong roles in economic management. While in the
urban sector the collective is often identified with the enterprise and its workers are
considered owners, in the rural sector the relevant collective has been the entire community. 45
From the beginning of the reform period in 1978, the leadership has encouraged
the development of both urban collectives and rural industrial enterprises, or TVEs.
Both sectors, especially the rural one, have grown dramatically. In 1981, the collective
sector accounted for about twenty percent of the PRC's industrial output; and rural
industrial production was twenty-seven percent of collective output. By 1993, the collective sector accounted for about thirty-eight percent of industrial output and TVEs
accounted for sixty-nine percent of collective output. 46

43. See generally William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991).
44. The situation of the townships became more ambiguous in the 1980s when they were given a variety
of administrative functions previously performed at higher levels and their budgets were integrated with those
of higher level units. Notwithstanding the change, townships are still considered essentially self-governing
units rather than agencies of the state.
45. See Jianzhong Tang & Laurence J. C. Ma, Evolution of Urban Collective Enterprises in China, CHI·
NA Q., Dec. 1985, at 614 (discussing urban collectives).
46. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1994, supra note 7, at 351; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA 1981 212
(1981).
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Because of their institutional novelty and their phenomenal growth, the TVEs have
attracted the most attention, and this Article focuses on them here. The central
government's policy has been to leave broad discretion to townships and villages in
shaping industrial development. 47 TVEs have developed in almost every area of industrial activity except natural resources extraction, including highly capital intensive forms
of manufacturing and processing. They have taken a variety of legal forms. 48
Some TVEs are organized as private-typically family proprietorships or partnerships. In the Wenzhou area of Zhejiang province, south of Shanghai, a booming economy of mostly small-scale manufacturing is organized largely as private firms. On the
other hand, just north of Shanghai in southern Jiangsu county, another booming TVE
economy consists almost entirely of local government owned enterprises. Other areas
show more of a mix, but the "Southern Jiangsu model" is the more dominant. Most
large TVEs and many small ones are public. 49
The institutional structure of the TVEs is notoriously amorphous, and crude classifications can be misleading. The practical distinction between public and private enterprises is often not what the name suggests. Some private entrepreneurs choose to designate their enterprises as public so as to qualify for subsidies or avoid popular hostility
to private wealth. 50 Such "red hat" enterprises may be functionally indistinguishable
from private businesses.
At the same time, private enterprises are often extremely dependent on local government and subject to extensive collective controls. Even in areas of intense private
entrepreneurialism, both governments and quasi-public industrial associations play important roles in providing technical and marketing assistance, facilitating transactions,
allocating credit, and providing land, buildings, and infrastructure. Though these activities are often initiated and controlled by entrepreneurs, they are typically conducted
through government agencies. The success of the small private household industries
producing buttons and badges in Wenzhou depends in part on collectively run "main
factories" that furnish supplies to households and certify the quality of their output. The
factories are owned by the household "branches" in conjunction with the village and
township collectives. 51

47. Although populations vary widely, a typical township has 30,000 to 40,000 people; a typical village
has 1,000 to 2,000. CHINA'S RURAL INDUSTRY 3 (William Byrd & Lin Qingsong eds., 1990) [hereinafter
RURAL INDUSTRY).
48. See id. at 129-218.
49. Official 1993 statistics show about 95% of rural industrial employment in collective enterprises.
CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1994 65 (1994). A World Bank study of 1985 data estimated that 92% of the
output of the rural industrial sector came from public TVEs, with 45% coming from township enterprises,
38% from village enterprises, and 9% from production team enterprises. RURAL INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at
195.
50. Prior to 1988, there was no clear legal sanction for private business organizations with more than
seven workers. ("Individual" business organizations-defined as businesses employing no more than seven
people-had been recognized in the 1982 Constitution and subsequent legislation.) See Conner, supra note 6,
at 1-8. During this period, the temptation was especially strong to adopt the collective form in the hope of
acquiring more legal security. Some observers of the urban scene at this time interpreted the collective form
as simply a fig leaf for unabashedly capitalist enterprise. E.g., Howard Chao & Yang Xiaoping, Private Enterprise in China: The Developing law of Collective Enterprises, 19 INT'L LAW. 1215 (1985).
51. PETER NOLAN & DoNG FlJRENG, MARKET FORCES IN CHINA: COMPETlllON AND SMALL BUSINESS-
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Private ownership is nominally the norm in Nanhai county in booming Guangzhou
province. However, sociologists studying Nanhai county have recently described a "new
collective economy." In this relatively advanced economy, where enterprises produce a
quarter of China's aluminum output, collective enterprises play important roles in keeping enterprises abreast of technical developments and soliciting and allocating orders.52
Some firms have explicitly hybrid structures. For example, some township enterprises are leased to managers for fixed rental payments. The lessee has control and the
short-term residual interest. The township has the reversionary interest, though in practice, if the enterprise is successful, it will often sell out to the lessee. In some areas,
joint ventures between collective and private firms are common.
Another hybrid variation arises when a small private business grows to substantial
size and then converts to a collective. Such a move might be attractive because it would
improve access to capital and thus reduce the risk for both managers and workers.
Moreover, managers sometimes receive improved compensation when they become
public officials. Upon conversion, the managers retain control, as well as some vaguely
specified residual interest. The township's control and residual rights increase, but only
incremental}y.
At the township level, the most characteristic structure involves enterprise supervision by a Township Industrial Commission, which is often analogized to a holding
company or a conglomerate. 53 The latter seems more apt since the Commissions appear more activist than holding companies, but many TVEs seem to have more autonomy than American conglomerate enterprises, particularly with respect to raising capital.
Like a conglomerate, the Township Industrial Commission chooses and monitors management of the operating enterprises, allocates capital (and often land and workers), and
participates in major strategic decisions, while leaving routine operations and moderate
scale decisions to the enterprise itself. Capital allocation takes the form of either direct
investments by the township or, more commonly, recommendations or guarantees to the
national banking system. Local government also controls land and infrastructural services. s4
The Township receives three revenue streams from the enterprises. First, the enterprises within the township pay taxes. In accordance with China's elaborate hierarchical
fiscal system, these revenues must be shared with upper levels of government and their
local uses are extensively mandated by the central and provincial governments. Second,
the Townships receive some or all of the profit distributions of their publicly owned

THE WENZHOU DEBATE 97-125 (1990); Dong Fureng, Shareholding Cooperative Enterprise-Reform in Enterprise OrganilJltional Form, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 14-15 (Dec. 3, 1991) (discussing "main branch"
factories in Wenzhou).
52. See generally WANG YING, SI-UCHANG JINGn YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI ZUZI-ll JIEGOU DE BIANQIAN
[CHANGES IN TIIE MARKET EcONOMY AND STRUCTURES OF CI-UNESE SOCIETAL ORGANIZATION] (1994).
53. See RURAL INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 339-87.
54. Another analogy that seems relevant in areas with extensive private ownership is a venture capital
investment company. Like a conglomerate, a venture capital firm provides capital, monitoring, and expertise,
but has a smaller stake and less control. At the point where the firm becomes successful, the investment firm
facilitates diversification of finance by taking the firm "public." The process by which private finns convert to
collectives is in some respects analogous to that by which Western firms "go public" by selling shares on the
stock market Here, however, diversification takes place only within the local capital market
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enterprises. These revenues are considered "extrabudgetary" and thus need not be
shared and can be spent locally within the Township's discretion. 55 Third, the Township Industrial Commission receives a management fee from the Township enterprises.
Two sorts of explanations exist for the predominance of public TVE ownership.56
One suggests that the government uses its monopoly power over property rights protection, finance, and land to discriminate against private enterprise. The other explanation
emphasizes the important productive functions that local government is distinctively
equipped to perform and that require close relations with the enterprises. First, local
goverriments are well situated to conduct financial intermediation. They have better
information than outside institutions about local investment prospects, and they are
better able to collateralize debts than private entrepreneurs. They can collateralize better
because the townships have more capital and because township officials have career and
reputational interests that support honest dealings more than typical private entrepreneurs. Second, public ownership involves risk pooling that may be quite desirable in a
community with little private wealth, and in doing so, it also constrains inequality.
Third, the townships may be well-situated to provide technical or marketing assistance
to enterprises that are too small to procure it individually in an economic manner.
Fourth, community ownership reduces the conflict of interest over tax collection and
payment for public goods that arises with private ownership. Private owners have an
interest in hiding and understating income which has made effective tax collection difficult.
Observers have had difficulty discerning the internal structures of the TVEs. Two
characteristics that everyone agrees on are that the structures are highly informal and
that they often do not correspond to familiar Western models of private or state enterprise. However, with the help of an excellent empirical study by the World Bank in the
mid-1980s and the Regulations on Township and Village Collective Enterprises promulgated by the central government in 1992, we can get a general sense of at least one
important model for such enterprises.57 The three distinctive themes noticed in the
SOE structure are again evident.
Authority. The law provides that TVEs are part of a "socialist economy based on 1
public ownership;"58 that the enterprise's property is owned "by the residents [of the
township or village] as a collective;" and that the local resident's assembly exercises the
rights of ownership. 59 It specifies as rights of ownership the election of the director
and decisions regarding major business policies, dividend distributions, major structural

55. See Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,
45 WORLD POL. 99, 103-05 (1992).
56. Both explanations can be found in RURAL INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 129-218. The positive explanations are emphasized in Zheyuen Cui, China's Rural Industrialization: Flexible Specialization, MoebiusStrip Ownership, and Proudhonian Socialism (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
57. RURAL INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 134-218, 339-88; Xiangcun Jiti Suoyouzhi Qiye Tiaolie [Rural
Collective Enterprise Regulations] (State Council 1990) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter TVE Regs]; see also Weitzman
& :/(u, supra note 3, at 131-36.
58. See TVE Regs, supra note 57, art. 3.
59. Id. art. 18.
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changes such as mergers, and bankruptcy. However, the law cautions that "[t]he owner
shall respect the autonomy of the enterprises.',(,()
The latter qualification reflects the concern that local officials may interfere in
corrupt or economically short-sighted ways. Complaints are common in some areas that
officials demand personal favors,6 1 treat enterprise revenues as available to cover fiscal
shortfalls, or insist that they expand employment to absorb local excess labor beyond
the point that would be efficient for the enterprise. Perversely but understandably, such
practices are most common in the poorest areas.
Language in the law suggests that local congresses elect managers. In practice,
however, party cadres usually appoint managers. With the encouragement of the national government, some localities have experimented with auctioning off managerial jobs
or subleasing entire enterprises through auction processes in which aspirants bid competitively by promising to remit specified levels of return to the township. 62
The juxtaposition of strong managerialism and worker participation is again striking. The enterprise powers associated with the status of "legal person" (contracting,
holding and conveying property, initiating and defending lawsuits) are to be exercised
by the director (though presumably he or she can delegate). 63 The law provides that
"[t]he director will have full responsibility in management," and that "[t]he director has
full authority regarding the affairs of the enterprise. "64
The grant of "full" responsibility and authority has to be read in the light of the
local government's ownership control over major policy decisions. Still, the law seems
to give the manager at least as much power as a Western board of directors has formally. Although the practical role of the board in the West is less than the formal one, its
oversight role is significant, and the collective legal model provides no internal organizational counterpart. However, the Township government and its Industrial Commission
have the practical ability to engage in potentially intense oversight.
Again, the managerial theme co-exists with a worker control theme. The Constitution mandates that collective enterprises practice "democratic management.''65 The regulations elaborate:
Workers have the right to participate in democratic management and to
criticize and accuse managers and their staff. The enterprise workers' congress or the representatives of the workers are entitled to voice criticisms
and opinions regarding problems to managers or members of his staff and to
protect the legal rights of the workers. 66

60. Id. art. 19.
61. The practice of tampai-free products for government officials-is specifically condemned in the
Collective Law, which encourages enterprises to denounce officials who demand such favors. Id. art. 40.
62. The idea is to force choice of the manager on the basis of economic productivity, but as a practical
matter it seems doubtful that auctions can function impersonally in these contexts. Prospective managers have
limited abilities to collateralize their promises and, even if they could do so fully, would not be plausible risk
bearers, so the critical factor in the decision will be the subjective assessment of the competence and trustworthiness of the aspirant.
63. TYE Regs, supra note 57, art. 11.
64. Id. art. 22.
65. Id. art. 17.
66. Id. art. 26.
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Most observers are skeptical that worker participation amounts to much in practice. As
with the state enterprises, even highly satisfied workers seem to feel they have little
power. 67
Nevertheless, some areas have experimented with an important form of worker
power not contemplated in the statute-election of managers. The motivation for this
reform seems not to have been democratic ideals so much as a belief that elected managers would be better able to resist government fiscal predation. It is also suggested that
elected directors would be in a better position to make necessary layoffs without compromising morale. Since a substantial portion of worker compensation amounts to bonus
and profit sharing payments, workers as a body are hurt by overstaffing. The experiment has reportedly been successful in at least one jurisdiction-Shaxi township in
Jiangxi province-and despite the narrowness of its initial motivation, it may prove a
step toward giving substance to workers' participatory rights. 68
Membership. The membership notion-the second recurring theme-is not explicit
in the collective law, but it is prominent in the practical arrangements surrounding the
TVEs, some of which are codified in other law. Considered as separate entities, neither
the TVEs nor the individual worker's status in them has the permanence long associated
with (though perhaps eroding in) the state enterprises. The TVEs operate on relatively
hard budget constraints; there is no explicit or implicit public commitment to keep them
going regardless of profitability. Bankruptcies are common.
The worker tenure norm of the state-owned enterprises does not apply even in the
larger, more successful TVEs. The worker's relation is contractual,69 which means
workers are subject to dismissal and layoff. As noted above, some township governments pressure managers not to layoff or to hire unneeded workers, but in theory no
workers have the type of tenure associated with the state-owned enterprises.
Compensation practices vary. Some workers are paid piece rates. However, many
operate on quite egalitarian standards. The 1990 guidelines of the Ministry of Agriculture recommend that the director's salary should normally not exceed three times that of
the average worker and never five times. 70
The in-kind, collective consumption associated with the SOE occurs in the TVEs,
but to a lesser degree. The State Council regulations require that an unspecified fraction
of profits be devoted to employee welfare expenditures. Ministry of Agriculture regulations specify that amounts equal to at least ten percent of total wages be used for welfare expenditures (health, sickness, culture, and recreation) and one and a half percent
of total wages be used to fund employee education.71

67. But see infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing recent experiments in village level
democracy).
68. RURAL INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 380.
69. TVE Regs, supra note 57, art. 28.
70. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, XIANGZHEN QIYE CHENGBAO JINGYING ZERENzHI GUIDING DI SHI JIU
nAO [REGULATION OF CONTRACT REsPONSIBILITY SYSTEM OF TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES), reprinted in NONGMIN GUFEN HEzuo QIYE [RURAL SHAREHOLDING COOPERATIVES) 241 (1990) [hereinafter
SHAREHOLDING COOPERATIVES].

71.

TVE Regs, supra note 57, art. 32; MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, XIANGZHEN QIYE CAIWU ZHIDU

[TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM], reprinted in SHAREHOLDING COOPERATIVES,

supra note 70, at 241.
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However, the most important dimension of membership associated with the TVEs
is membership in the community. This dimension appears in two salient respects: first,
the dependence of eligibility for the core workforce on lawful permanent residence in
the community, and second, the distribution of benefits in the form of collective consumption by residents.
The Communist regime has severely restricted its citizens' geographic mobility.
The "household registration" system restricts each individual's lawful residence to a
specific locality-presumptively the mother's residence-that can be changed only with
official permission. Moreover, until recently, all housing was publicly owned and allocated, and basic food and cooking goods were publicly rationed. Housing and ration
coupons were available only in the jurisdiction of a person's registered residence.
These controls have loosened during the reforms. Reregistration is easier. Permission to leave one's current jurisdiction of residence is no longer essential. Permission
from the new jurisdiction is necessary, however. This is not easy to get, although some
jurisdictions grant it to people with job offers in the locality, sometimes on payment of
fees (or bribes). Moreover, the abolition of food rationing and the emergence of a private housing market have reduced the practical importance of lawful residence.
TVE development has occurred in a geographically uneven way, with most of the
successful activity in areas of the coastal provinces of the South and East. This success
has generated demand for labor that has induced massive migration to the booming
townships. By and large, however, the new workers have not been accepted as legal
residents of the townships. They are, to use the European term, "guest workers."
These workers are a major presence in most townships that have experienced industrial development. For example, in Nanhai County in Guangzhou, where the local
labor force numbers 600,000, there are 300,000 guest workers. An extreme example is
the notorious Daqiuzhuang, near Tianjin, where a few years ago there were about 4,400
villagers and 30,000 guest workers.
Some localities regulate immigration intensely, bringing workers in under contracts
that limit their stay to fixed periods. Some have built special housing for them. Typically the arrangements do not permit them to bring family members. In other areas, there
is less formal regulation.
The government generally prohibits discrimination in compensation between resident and guest workers. 72 But other types of discrimination are lawful. The best jobs
typically go to residents. Guest workers can be expelled when there is no work for
them. They may be denied the right to bring their families to live with them. And they
are denied access to a broad range of public goods provided residents.
In the collective sector, the most salient locus of collective consumption is the
township or village, rather than the enterprise. Compensation of workers within the
enterprise is "lower than their marginal productivities, lower than wages of state enter-

72. See MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUO XIANGZHEN QIYE FA (CAO AN
SONG SHEN GAO) DI Sm JIU TIAO [TOWNSIDP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE PRC] (draft for review), reprinted in ZHONGGUO XIANGZHEN QIYE NIANDU XUESHU LUNWENn [COLLECTED MATERIALS ON
CHINESE TOWNSHIP ENTERPRISES) 145 (Zhang Yi ed., 1991) [hereinafter MATERIALS]. Although my informants asserted that wage discrimination against nonresidents was uncommon, there are reports of it. ANITA
CHAN ET AL., CHEN VILLAGE UNDER MAO AND DENG 304 (1992).
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prises, and ... not correlated with the profitability of the enterprises."73 A large part
of the resident worker's effective compensation comes from public goods provided by
the township or village with revenues collected from successful enterprises. These public goods take myriad forms-schools, public utility services, recreation, ceremonies,
and festivals. In prosperous localities these benefits can be lavish, and the exclusion of
nonresidents makes salient the value of community membership.
Reinvestment. The national regulations provide that forty percent of profits be paid
to the local government. The enterprise retains the remaining sixty percent for reinvestment, bonus payments, and employee welfare expenditures. 74 Local regulations typically provide that a substantial portion of the enterprise's portion of its earnings-often
fifty percent-be reinvested. 75
III. CORPORATIZATION

The pace of reform slowed after the Tiananmin Square massacre of 1989, but only
briefly. When the reform movement regained momentum, reformers proposed new legal
models and began to implement them in both the SOE and TVE sectors. In the SOE
sector, reformers moved toward the "shareholding system"; in the TYE sector, they
pushed the "shareholding cooperative" structure.
In both sectors, corporatization was proposed as a means of "clarification of property rights"-a constantly recurring phrase in Chinese discussions of enterprise reform
in recent years. The leadership's most recent major statement on reform-the 1993
"Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure"--describes as the
first "basic feature" of a "modern enterprise system" that "the property rights relations
are clearly defined" and then proceeds to recommend "experimentation with the corporate system." Turning collectives into shareholding cooperatives is also urged in order
to "strengthen property rights."76 Though the idea of "clarification [or strengthening] of
property rights" is itself far from clear, the term has unmistakably managerial implications. Property rights become clearer the more readily we can identify a single actor (or
small group) who has unilateral dominion over the enterprise.77

73. Weitzman & Xu, supra note 3, at 133.
74. TYE Regs, supra note 57, art. 32.
75. Oi, supra note 55, at 117.
76. Decision of the CPC Central Committee, supra note 2, at 24-25.
77. Several Chinese economists discussing the idea of clarification of property rights on my 1994 visit
referred to work by Harold Demsetz. See, e.g., Harold Desmsetz, A Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REv. 354-59 (1967) (suggesting that efficiency will usually require the concentration of ownership in a small
group); Harold Desmsetz & Armen Alchian, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. EcoN. REV. 777, 787-88 (1972) (recognizing that financial ownership claims on public corporations are
widely dispersed, but could be read to suggest that control rights are and should be concentrated). Later literature, less well known to the people I met, rejects these views in favor of a vision of the firm as a "nexus of
contracts" in which financial and control rights are diffused among myriad constituencies. See, e.g., Eugene
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON. 288, 290 (1980) ("In this 'nexus-ofcontracts' perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept."). The trend of this literature has been
quite different from the inferences drawn in China from the early pieces. The later articles renounce any idea
of specifying the optimal ownership structure generally and instead insist that, as long as a firm's shares are
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The developments in both SOE and TVE areas involved appeals to Western corporate models. Both represented steps toward more conventionally capitalist forms of
organization and away from the distinctive features of authority, membership, and reinvestment. Although these themes were attenuated in the new models, they persisted.

A. State-Owned Enterprises
Despite some major successes, a sense of crisis has surrounded the SOEs during
the 1990s. Two problems have been most salient. First, one-half to two-thirds of the
SOEs remain dependent on subsidies which in turn are a major component of a growing
state deficit. Although many reasons are given for the failure of these enterprises, the
reason considered the most important and least tractable is the SOEs' continued inability to shed workers or drastically cut compensation.
Second, the decapitalization of the enterprises by managers and workers is troublesome. The softer forms of decapitalization take the form of excessive compensation.
The incentive features of the "contract responsibility system" encourage the enterprise
to overstate its income-for example, by underestimating depreciation-and to forego
maintenance expenses in order to finance current compensation. The harder forms of
decapitalization take the form of managerial self-dealing. Managers sell stock to themselves and cronies at unduly low prices. They transfer assets without adequate compensation from their SOE to enterprises they have interests in. They commit their SOEs to
joint ventures with affiliated entities on terms skewed toward the latter. At the same
time, managers have continued to complain of unprincipled or outright corrupt interference by state officials.
The focus of debate over legal reform has now shifted to corporatization. A large
body of literature has emerged; though some of it is skeptical, most writers have argued
that some form of corporatization would improve the SOEs. The appeal of the corporate
form seems to rest for some on little more than the glamour of its perceived association
with economic modernity. Others favor it as a means of facilitating foreign investment
or the development of a domestic capital market.
But the strongest emphasis has been on the potential contribution of the corporate
form to balancing official and managerial power and limiting state economic responsibility. The Central Committee's program document argues that "corporations can effectively accomplish the separation between the ownership of investors and the rights of
enterprise" and are "conducive to ... enabling enterprises to get rid of reliance on administrative organizations and enabling the state to get rid of its unlimited responsibility

widely traded, the capital markets will find the right structure for each firm. Of course, it would be more
difficult to make this argument in a society in which state ownership remains the "mainstay" of the economy.
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for enterprises."78 In fact, however, the literature is not very specific as to how
corporatization is to contribute to these goals.
The rhetoric of the "separation of ownership and control" in the modem corporation, popularized in the 1930s in the West by Adolph Berle and Gardner Means, has
played a distinctive role in recent discussions in China. For Berle and Means, the separation of ownership and control represented a problem-managerial unaccountability-that called for imposing responsibility on management. Some recent Chinese reformers have seized on Berle and Means's rhetoric as if "separation" were a solution to
an entirely different problem-the interference of government officials in the operation
of enterprises. Thus, ironically, Berle and Means's rhetoric is identified in some recent
Chinese debates with proposals that tend to enlarge managerial discretion to degrees
they would have considered implausible.
The closest thing to a comprehensive picture of what a corporatized SOE would
look like is the Company Law enacted in late 1993.79 The Company Law represents
the convergence of the corporatization project, focussing primarily on corporate governance, with a partially distinct "securitization" project, focussing primarily on finance.
During the 1980s, central and provincial governments permitted a few enterprises
to experiment with issuing securities. Local markets for the exchange of these securities
were permitted in several areas. In 1990 Shanghai opened a stock exchange listing securities in a few state enterprises; in 1992 Shenzhen opened its exchange, listing a few
more SOE securities.
Though these securities were sometimes called "shares," most looked more like
bonds, with fixed payment guarantees and no control rights. In 1992, however, the State
Council endorsed limited experimentation with corporatization, contemplating the issuance of shares with control rights. It also published proposed company legislation, and
Shanghai and Guangdung province (where Shenzhen is located) enacted provincial com-

78. Decision of the CPC Central Committee, supra note 2, at 24. A sampling of the literature on
corporatization in English translation includes State Commission for Restructuring Economic System, Production System Department, Properly Run Joint-Stock System Pilot Projects According to Standardized Requirements, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 34-39 (Aug. 3, 1992); Liu Guoliang, Market Economy: State Enterprises
Facing Serious Tests, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 9-10 (Jan. 22, 1993); Liu Hongru, Probe for a Correct
Path-Questions on the Experiments in Joint Stock Companies and the Stock Market, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS),
at 20-27 (Oct. 21, 1993);· Chao Qian & Xin Yi, Some Thoughts on Overhauling Enterprise Operating Mechanisms, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS) (Sept 23, 1992); Sun Xiaoliang, A Contradiction in Continuing Enterprise
Reform, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 21-23 (Sept. 15, 1992); Zhan Zhongde & Ma Ping, Use Shareholding
System to Revitalize State Enterprises, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 30-33 (Jan. 8, 1993). An influential early
work by the leading academic proponent of corporatization is Li Yinning, A Conception of Reform of the
Ownership System of Our Country, Daily Rep. China (FBIS), at K5-I I (Oct. 22, 1986). For a well known
article by a lawyer expressing skepticism about corporatization, see Wang Liming, Lun Gufen Z: Qiye
Shuoyouqian De Erchong Jiegou [On the Dual Structure of Stock Enterprise Ownership], I ZHONGGUO
FAXUE [JURIS. CHINA] 47, 47-56 (1989). Some of the literature is cited and summarized in Jianfu Chen,
Securitisation of State-Owned Enterprises and the Ownership Controversy in the PRC, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 59
(1993).
79. Company Law, Daily Rep. China (FBIS), at 27-48 (Jan. 26, 1994).

288

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

pany laws. 80 These were pre-empted the following year by the national Company Law,
which applies to SOE stock companies, as well as private ones.
The 1993 Central Committee policy statement authorized reformers to "experiment
with the corporate system." It cautioned, however, that only a "small number" of SOEs
should have publicly traded shares. 81 Several thousand SOEs have since been converted to stock companies, though only a few hundred have had their shares traded on exchanges. In most of the new corporations, shares not held by the state directly are held
by other enterprises and organizations ("legal persons"), most of which are themselves
state-owned, or by managers and workers of the enterprise itself. Typically, "legal person" shares can be traded only among organizations; two organized national markets for
trading "legal person" shares now operate. Manager and worker shares typically cannot
be traded outside the enterprise (though some transfer restrictions lapse after a period of
time). 82
The Company Law is a more or less wholesale importation of a European, notably
German, model. This cross-cultural borrowing reflects the prestige of the economic
institutions of the pioneer capitalist countries. It also represents a desire to encourage
foreign investors by providing a legal regime familiar to them.
The choice of the German model over competing capitalist ones probably reflects
historically embedded intellectual affinities. China's legal system was strongly influenced by civil, especially German, law in the late Qing and Republican periods, and the
influence survived in the system the Guomindang developed on Taiwan. Moreover, the
Soviet Union, which remained the dominant foreign intellectual influence on China until
well into the reform period, had incorporated extensively civil law principles and rhetoric in its legal system. In adopting the Principles of Civil Law in 1986, PRC law makers had signalled an attraction to civil law models. 83
It comes as no surprise to Western lawyers that a corporation code adopted
wholecloth from the West leaves many key questions about Chinese enterprise structures unanswered. Few European or American lawyers would argue that their corporation statutes are functionally well-adapted to their own practical circumstances, much
less to China's. In both Europe and America, much of the most important corporate law

80. See Chen, supra note 78, at 60-64; see also, Pitman B. Potter, The Legal Framework for Securities
Markets in China: The Challenge of Maintaining State Control and Inducing Investor Confidence, 1 ClilNA L.
REP. 61 (1992).
81. See Decision of the CPC Central Committee, supra note 2, at 24.
82. Transfer of legal person shares was previously restricted by general regulation. The Company Law
now provides in article 143 that all "shares may be transferred in accordance with law." Transfer restrictions
now take the form of charter provisions or contracts specific to the particular enterprise.
83. The Qing Company Law of 1904 was influenced by Germany by way of the German-influenced
Japanese Code. The Republican Company Law of 1929 was directly influenced by the German model, and
this influence survived in the 1949 revision. William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and
Business Enterprise in Twentieth Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 47, 49, 54-55 (1995). On Russia's
reliance on civil law principles, see Andrei Baev, Legal Mechanisms of Monitoring State Property in Russia
27-58 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
Taiwan's Company Law is also said to have specifically influenced the PRC's. See REPUBLIC OF ClilNA MINISTRY OF EcONOMIC AFFAIRS, COMPANY LAW (1995); NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE
AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRooucnoN 251-79 (Tony Weir trans., 1982).
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is nonstatutory-for example, fiduciary duties-and many preoccupations of the statutes
seem anachronistic-for example, the legal (registered) capital regimes.
Moreover, recent Western scholarship has suggested that the key issues of corporate governance are largely outside corporate law, as conventionally defined. Corporate
codes are largely devoted to regulating the interaction of shareholders, managers, and
creditors. But the most important practical distinctions now seem to depend on how
shares are allocated among different types of investors, which in tum depends on a
variety of rules outside the corporate code. In Germany and Japan, financial intermediaries holding substantial blocks of shares deal directly with management. In the United
States, where shares are more dispersed and intermediaries more constrained, the stock
market (and the takeover) play more important roles. 84 Like its Western counterparts,
the PRC Company Law is silent about to whom shares in large corporations will be
allocated. The leadership's commitment to state ownership as the "mainstay" of the
economy would seem to imply that the state own at least a controlling block of the
shares in most enterprises, which most proposals seem to contemplate. 85
How will the state's shareholder rights be exercised? Surprisingly, the
corporatization experiment was launched before any definite answer to this question was
reached, and apparently even before much thought had been given to it. For the moment, a large fraction of state shares are held by the industrial ministries or, in some
instances, the holding company structures that have taken their places. Most of the rest
are held by the National Administrative Bureau of State-Owned Property, created in
1988 as an arm of the State Council to superintend the state's interest in the reformed
enterprises.
Few regard the current arrangements as satisfactory, however. The industrial ministries often try to continue their old ways of commanding enterprise management. The
National Administrative Bureau of State-Owned Property is primarily an auditing agency; it has neither adequate staffing nor expertise to participate actively in corporate
governance.
Recent discussions of institutionalizing the state's shareholder role appear to be
converging on a structure that, if implemented successfully, would constitute a new
form of market socialism. The structure has three tiers. The corporatized operating companies are the bottom tier. The middle tier would consist of intermediaries of various
types holding the operating company shares. The intermediaries would include holding
companies, investment companies, charitable foundations, and pension funds. Most of

84.

See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF

AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
85. Li Yinning's influential proposal suggested that the state should retain a controlling interest but that
"one-third, two-fifths, or even less" of outstanding shares would be sufficient for control. Yinning, supra note

78, at K7.
According to Shanghai officials I spoke to in 1995, in the 92 listed companies formed from former
SOEs controlled by the Shanghai government, the government holds on average 53% of the shares.
The Central Committee program document says, "Companies that tum out special-category products
and those producing armaments should be held by the state alone. In key enterprises in 'backbone' and basic
industries, the state should have controlling shares and at the same time bring in non-state capital ...." Decision of the CPC Central Committee, supra note 2, at 24. The implication that the state might take a minority
position in other industries is unelaborated.
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these intermediaries would in turn be owned wholly or in part by state agencies forming
the top tier, perhaps by an expanded National Administrative Bureau of State-Owned
Property, or perhaps as some would prefer, a new agency accountable directly to the
National People's Congress and its Standing Committee.
One promising feature of the model is that it would make possible competition
among intermediaries in monitoring. As long as intermediary managers are given incentives to maximize returns and many intermediaries are free to invest or disinvest in any
given enterprise, competition might induce effective monitoring of the operating companies.
Competition at the top level would not be possible, but it should be possible to
specify a set of fairly simple rules for officials at the top that would make it easy for a
separate government agency to audit performance. In essence, top level officials would
be instructed to move capital into and out of the intermediaries in accordance with their
relative perforrnances. 86 This approach presupposes that the government will pursue
social goals distinct from profit maximization through the regulation and the tax-transfer
system, rather than through ownership. Many reformers are quite clear about this, fearing that social goals are too vague to permit monitoring and accountability through
corporate institutions. A compromise would be to set up a separate set of investment
and monitoring institutions for "social" investing.
At the moment, the banking system plays no role in corporate monitoring. The law
forbids banks to hold shares. But many proposals contemplate an important role for
banks. Banks have a substantial fraction of China's economic expertise. Moreover,
banks hold massive debt claims on the SOEs that are uncollectible in their current
forms and need restructuring. One alternative popular with reformers is a swap of debt
for equity, which would give enterprises more flexibility and tum banks into major
shareholders. 87
The few publicly traded SOE corporations typically have dispersed individual
shareholders. However, there is little expectation that they will play any direct role in
corporate monitoring. (The Company Law does not provide for cumulative voting or
derivative suits, nor does it give majority shareholders duties to minority ones.) On the
other hand, some reformers have expressed the hope that the share prices in the public

86. Many experiments with intermediary structures for managing state enterprises have been tried in
recent decades, though they have generally not contemplated competition among the intermediaries. See generally ANJALI KUMAR, STATE HOLDING COMPANIES AND PuBLIC ENTERPRISES IN TRANSffiON (1993).
China's size and the fragmentation of its government structure offer a distinctively auspicious setting for trying to achieve a competitive structure.
87. Qian, supra note 40, at 33; Financial System Reform in China: Lessons from Japan's Main Bank
System, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING
ECONOMIES 552, 575-78 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994). A 1985 World Bank report on China
focused attention on the idea of exercising corporate control through multiple independent public intermediaries. WORLD BANK, CHINA: LoNG TERM DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS 165-66 (1985). See also the
interesting interpretation of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" by Bo Yibo, an elder of the revolutionary
generation, which does not mention clarifying property rights and suggests that the "initial conditions for
developing joint stock enterprises on the basis of public ownership" have been created by the diffusion of
SOE control among different public institutions. Bo Yibo, Correctly Handle the Relationship Between Planning and the Market, Daily Rep. China (FBIS), at 28, 39 (Feb. 3, 1993).

1996)

Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market" Enterprise

291

market of these companies will provide an important signal to controlling shareholders
of how well management is doing. Others doubt that the market in the near tenn will
become sufficiently infonnationally efficient to perfonn such a role.
The Company Law represents a dilution of the three distinctive themes of the
1980s rhetoric, but the themes are still notably present.
Authority. For the refonners, the greatest appeal of the corporate fonn is as a model for the "separation of administration and management." Corporatization converts the
state from a sovereign with plenary powers to a corporate shareholder. In this way,
corporatization purports to limit the state's power of unprincipled or ad hoc intervention
in the affairs of the business.
Managers of a corporation are not agents subject to the general authority of the
shareholders. Under the new Company Law, as under its Western counterparts, shareholders have the power to elect and remove the senior managers (directors) and to veto
certain fundamental alterations of the business, such as mergers, revisions of the share
structure, or liquidations. Aside from this limited class of decisions, however, while
they are in office, managers have general authority to run the business. Moreover,
though shareholders can remove directors with whom they are displeased, the Company
Law pennits removal during their tenns only for "proper justification."88
On the other hand, though corporatization is vaunted as a way of constraining state
power, some aspects of the Company Law in theory represent steps back from the extreme managerialism of the Enterprise Law. The meeting of shareholders is declared the
"highest power organ" in the enterprise. 89 Furthennore, managerial power is fragmented among, first, a "manager" with responsibility to "take charge of the company's operation [and] management"; second, a chairman of the board of directors, who is the
"company's legal representative"; third, a board of directors charged with fonnulating
the company's operating and strategic plans and hiring, firing, and supervising senior
management; and, fourth, a board of supervisors charged with "monitoring" managers
and directors to insure they "perfonn their duties to the company.',90
Whether the statute gives management more or less power than its Western counterparts is debatable. On the one hand, the statute gives the shareholders several powers
that American (and to a lesser extent, Gennan) shareholders nonnally do not have. In
addition to the power to elect directors and veto major "strategic" transactions, the statute prescribes shareholder power over the fixing of director's compensation, issuance of
bonds, and dividend payments.91 It also gives shareholders the right of "approval" of
the board of directors' business plan, which if construed as a right to veto it, is a power

88. Company Law, supra note 79, art. 115. The Company Law authorizes three separate types of corporations: ( I) limited liability companies, which have relatively smaller capital requirements, simpler governance
structures, and less readily tradable shares; (2) limited liability stock companies, which are generally large
companies with broadly traded stock; and (3) wholly state-owned companies, which have a simpler governance structure-since there is only a single shareholder, they dispense with shareholders' meetings. The
focus above is on limited liability stock companies, which seem to be the most important variation for SOE
reform.
89. Id. art. 110.
90. Id. arts. 126, 119, 112.
91. Id. art. 103.
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not normally enjoyed by Western shareholders. From this perspective, the Company
Law is less managerial than Western ones.
On the other hand, if we understand "management" to include not all members of
both boards, but primarily the Board of Directors, which typically consists of senior
full-time management, then arguably the PRC Law is more managerial. In the German
system, the shareholder-elected members of the supervisory board, who are part-timers
meeting only a few times a year, are usually thought of as "outside" directors acting
(though not necessarily effectively) as watchdogs on management. German law gives to
the supervisory board the power to appoint the managing board. 92 But the PRC Law
gives this power to the shareholders. Thus the PRC supervisory board is weaker. If, as
is often assumed, shareholders have more difficulty monitoring than supervisory directors, full-time management is stronger under the PRC Company Law.
Inevitably, the statute (even if we assume it will be enforced in good faith) is not a
guarantee against either official or managerial abuse. Although shareholders have no
right to instruct managers directly on a broad range of matters, their power to remove
them (even if, in the absence of cause for midterm removal, they must wait until the
end of their terms) may give them sufficient leverage to enforce their will on managers
continuously. On the other hand, while they are in office, managers have great power to
dispose of the corporation and its assets. In particular, given the concern about managerial asset stripping, it is surprising that the Company Law constraints on managerial
self-dealing are as brief and vague as they are. 93
Despite all the ambiguity and the retreat from some of the managerial rhetoric of
the Enterprise Law, Yingyi Qian reports that managers are wildly enthusiastic about
corporatization.94 The dominant popular connotation of corporate status is managerial
independence. At least in the absence of a developed system for the exercise of the
state's rights as majority shareholder, the monitoring provisions of the Company Law
do not seem threatening. Another benefit of corporatization is to avoid constraints on
wage levels and dispersion; the constraints do not apply to dividend payments.
The worker theme remains salient in the Company Law. Two sections of the Law
require the company to "invite" or "heed" worker opinions, and to allow worker attendance at management meetings on issues of "immediate concern" to workers and "important issues relating to production and operation."95 The Board of Supervisors must
include an "appropriate" number of "democratically elected" worker representatives. 96

92. 84 Aktiengesetz I (1965) (F.R.G.); HORN ET AL., supra note 83, at 260.
93. The Law forbids directors and managers to "use their positions and powers in the company to seek
personal gains" and to "sign contracts or conduct transactions with the company." Company Law, supra note
79, arts. 123, 61. These provisions could be interpreted to forbid all conflict-of-interest transactions, but it
seems more likely that they will be construed to permit transactions that are fair and provide benefits to the
corporation, even if managers benefit too, so long as managers do not contract in purely personal capacities
with the corporation (as opposed to through affiliated entities or relatives). If the latter interpretation is likely,
then a plausible procedural safeguard would have been a provision requiring conflict-of-interest transactions to
be ratified by independent directors or shareholders.
94. Qian, supra note 40, at 43.
95. Company Law, supra note 79, arts. 121-22.
96. Id. art. 124. Somewhat different norms apply to companies that are wholly state-owned and to limited liability companies (the presumptively smaller type of corporation with less readily transferable shares)
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(The number is to be decided by promoters or shareholders.) This is a substantial step
back from the German model which prescribes that half the supervisory positions must
go to workers, 97 but most other Western countries prescribe no worker board representation at all. 98
Membership. The membership theme survives explicitly in the Company Law principally in the requirement-foreign to American and German law-that a company set
aside five to ten percent of its profits in a "common welfare fund" to be used for "collective welfare programs of the company's workers."99 As mentioned above, the 1994
Labor Law provides for tenure, but only after ten years of employment.
In fact, SOEs continue to be encompassing communities with a reduced but substantial range of collective cultural and consumption responsibilities. Nevertheless, there
is a trend, particularly in SOEs converting to stock companies, to try to spin off housing and other consumption activities into separate organizations. These separate organizations operate on a fee-for-service basis.
One aspect of corporatization that bears on the membership theme is worker
shareholding. Together with managers, workers hold substantial blocks in most
corporatized enterprises. In some respects, the shareholder relation is the opposite of the
membership relation. Corporate shares are typically individual financial interests that
can be traded like commodities. However, worker shares in corporatized SOEs function
a little differently. They typically cannot be sold outside the enterprise and have to be
relinquished on departure. The reformers see their purpose as to counter worker pressures for short-term income distribution by giving them a capital stake designed to
reflect long-term enterprise performance. 100 On the other hand, shareholding weakens

fonned wholly or "primarily" by state-owned investors. First, these companies must practice "democratic
management." Id. art. 16. Though the meaning of the tennis far from clear, it could be construed to require a
more ambitious measure of worker participation than the consultation procedures mandated for limited liability stock companies. Second, these companies must include elected worker representatives on their boards
of directors. (These companies need not have supervisory boards.)
97. The Gennan requirement of one-half worker members applies to companies with more than 2,000
employees; in companies with more than 500 but fewer than 2,000, a third of the supervisory seats go to
employees. HORN ET AL., supra note 83, at 277.
98. See, e.g., Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving European Corporation Statute,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 749 (1993) (noting that of EC states, only Gennany and Netherlands require employee board representation).
99. Company Law, supra note 79, arts. 177, 180.
100. A significant step away from the membership theme is the Company Law's rejection of "enterprise
shares." Some commentators had urged that major blocks of stock in corporatized shares should be held by
the enterprise itself in its corporate capacity. Some pre-Company Law corporatization experiments had involved this, and two commentators suggested that the "enterprise shares" were "the essential difference between the system of shares in China and stock corporations in the West." Gu Peidong & Liu Xirong, Study on
Turning State-Owned Enterprises into Stock Companies, 9 Soc. Sci. ClflNA 25, 36-40 (1988).
To Western lawyers the notion of "enterprise shares" begs the question of who within the enterprise is
to have the financial and control rights of the shares and invites confusion and sharp practice. Thus, Western
codes typically forbid voting or distributions on shares held by the issuing enterprise. However, the appeal of
enterprise shares to some of the commentators might be interpreted as a desire to preserve a larger role for
more infonnal and collective modes of decision-making and distribution. The Company Law rejects such
ideas by providing that the corporation cannot issue stock to itself and must cancel repurchased shares. Company Law, supra note 79, art. 149.
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norms of internal egalitarianism reflected in the constraints on wage dispersion since
shares and dividends are typically distributed much more unequally than wages.
Reinvestment. The reinvestment constraints of the Company Law are much weaker
than under the Enterprise Law, but they remain stronger than the Western counterparts.
As under the Western models, amounts paid for the company's stock become the measure of its "registered capital," and distributions to shareholders that would reduce its
assets below this sum are prohibited. In addition, the company is obliged to contribute
ten percent of its profits annually to a reserve fund until the fund equals fifty percent of
its registered capital, and distributions that would impair the reserve fund are also prohibited.101 The company can invest in other companies, but such outside investments
are not supposed to exceed fifty percent of its net assets. 102 In the West, the reserve
fund is understood as a safeguard for creditors rather than a commitment by owners to
develop the enterprise. Nevertheless, the unusually demanding requirement of the Company Law may partly reflect a commitment to internal reinvestment as desirable in
itself.

B. Township and Village Enterprises
Despite the phenomenal aggregate success of the rural industrial sector, the idea
that reform of the legal structure of the TVEs is needed became popular in the 1990s.
Legal reform proposals are most strongly associated with the areas of successful TVE
development. The problems of the less developed areas are usually attributed to factors
other than legal structure, such as low skill levels, poor access to capital, and incompetent cadres.
But in the more successful areas, it was widely asserted that enterprises were constrained by outmoded legal structures, especially "unclear property rights." In a few
areas, especially near Shenzhen and Shanghai, with capital intensive enterprise and
access to outside capital markets, there was a desire for a legal structure that would
facilitate investment from outside the community.
However, by far the most prominently expressed goal of reform has been to limit
the abusive powers of government officials. Complaints are widespread that government
officials siphon off enterprise income for their personal benefit, force enterprises to hire
cronies or political allies, or induce enterprises to undertake business commitments that
indirectly benefit the officials. In many townships outside of the most developed areas,
a single person holds the offices of party chief, head of the township government, and
direc~or of the township investment corpor;ttion-a situation popularly referred to as the
"holy trinity." Even where these offices are separated, government officials retain great
power to hold up enterprises.
These complaints are quite similar to those made about SOE managers, but discussion of abuse in the TVE sector differs in that the corresponding danger of managerial
abuse is thought to be much weaker. Whether because of the harder budget constraints
and more competitive environment of the TVEs or the better information and incentives

IOI. Id. art. 177. In Germany, the reserve fund need be only 10% of basic capital. 57 Aktiengesetz I
(1965) (F.R.G.); HORN ET AL., supra note 83, at 268.
102. Company Law, supra note 79, art. 12.
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in a smaller scale environment, managerial performance in the TYE sector is more
highly regarded. The national Ministry of Agriculture officials charged with TYE reform consider local official abuse the critical problem. "We're trying to protect managers, not control them," one told me.
Again, the reformers see the solution to the problems in corporatization. The model
that has emerged from experimentation in areas such as Wenzhou and Nanhai and has
been promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture since 1992 is the "shareholding cooperative." By 1994 perhaps as many as ten percent of the TVEs had been converted to some
variation of this model. Again, the "separation of administration and ownership" is a
major goal. The state's authority for ad hoc intervention (as opposed to regulation and
taxation in accordance with laws of general application) is to be reduced to that of a
shareholder and limited by the extent of its shareholdings.
To encourage the move to "shareholding cooperatives," the Ministry proposed a
revision of the Township and Village Collective Enterprise regulations that redefines
TYE ownership. While the 1990 regulations locate ownership in the "whole people of
the locality," the revision provides that enterprises belong to "the whole people of the
locality and outside investors." 103 Interpretive guidelines describe the underlying principle as "he who invests, owns."'°4
The basic idea of the model is to apportion ownership rights among shares. The
Ministry's Model Articles of Organization provide simply that "people who invest in
the enterprise become shareholders," and place no restrictions on who may invest. 105
In practice, however, corporatization generally has not represented a major step toward
private ownership. In most shareholding cooperatives, the majority of shares are held
collectively by the township or the enterprise itself. Based on interviews in Guangdong
and Hebei provinces, Weitzman and Xu estimate that eighty percent of shares in a typical enterprise are collectively held. '06 Moreover, township or enterprise rules often
preclude resale of individually held shares outside the enterprise or township.
Collective institutions, such as the township industrial commission, typically hold a
substantial block. When a collective enterprise is converted to a shareholding cooperative, these shares are intended to compensate the township or village for its prior ownership interest. {In a reversal of the pattern of private appropriation of public capital
widely noted in the SOE sector, "red hat" entrepreneurs who have argued that since
their companies are only nominally private they should not have to give shares to the
public when they convert, have generally lost.) And the township or village will get
shares in a new enterprise if it invests in cash or in kind-for example, by providing
land.

103. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANGZHEN QIYE FA (CAO AN SONG
SHEN GAO) DI Slil JIU TIAO [TOWNSIIlP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
ClilNA] (draft for review), reprinted in MATERIALS. supra note 72, at 142.
104. Ministry of Agriculture, Xianzhen Chanquan Zhidu Gaige Yijian [Recommendations for the Reform
of the Township and Village Enterprise System] (Apr. I, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
JOS. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, NONGMIN GUFEN HEZUo QIYIE SlilFAN ZHANGCHENG [MODEL ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION FOR RURAL SHAREHOLDING COOPERATIVES], reprinted in MATERIALS, supra note
72, at 168 [hereinafter MODEL ARTICLES].
106. Weitzman & Xu, supra note 3, at 135.
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Another block of shares is commonly held in the name of the enterprise. The notion of "enterprise shares" was rejected for the urban sector in the Company Law, but
many insist it is vital in the TVE sector. The arguments for it are typically abstract and
assert that the shares acknowledge the organic nature of the enterprise-the extent to
which it is a whole independent of its constituents. Such claims seem implausible, not
because enterprises are not organic wholes, but because, in practice, the voting rights of
the enterprise shares are exercised by a single constituency: management.
Managers and workers hold another substantial block individually. Some shares are
typically given to them free; some are sold to them. The Ministry's Model Articles
require that workers be offered shares at bargain prices. 107 In some areas, local enterprises hold shares in each other.
Finally, shares are sometimes held by individuals outside the enterprise. These are
most commonly individuals within the locality, but some large TVEs sell shares outside
the locality. At the extreme, a few are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.
While the significance of the move toward corporatization is again to dilute the
three distinctive themes of authority, membership, and reinvestment, the dilution is less
than in the case of the SOEs.
Authority. In the Ministry's Model Articles of Organization for Shareholding Cooperatives, the enterprise director has the power to legally represent the company, hire
and fire junior managers and workers, and organize production. 108 The body of workers, whose relation is said to be "contractual," nonetheless has rights to participate in
"democratic management" through a workers' congress.
What is new is that the roles of manager and worker are now mediated by the
shareholders' meeting, which is empowered to choose, monitor, and remove the director, and the Board of Directors, which is supposed to hire, monitor, and if necessary,
remove the manager. Voting rights are allocated in proportion to shares. 109 Thus, the
critical determinant of authority is the allocation of shares, and what links the new model to the older one's insistence on exceptional (from a Western point of view) managerial and worker authority is the assumption (unstated in the regulations but reflected
pervasively in practice) that managers and workers will also be substantial shareholders.
Membership. In the TVE context, membership connotes relatively thick ties of
participants to both the enterprise and the community. As between managers and workers on the one hand and the enterprise on the other, the basic legal relation is contractual, 110 which connotes an absence of tenure, and as noted earlier, the TVEs operate on
hard hµdget constraints that put many out of business. Nevertheless, in viable enterprises the \vorker-enterprise relation has dimensions beyond the labor contract.
First, the worker is usually also a shareholder, and at least some of her shareholder
rights are contingent on working in the enterprise. Shares the worker receives without
payment usually revert without payment to the enterprise if and when the worker

107.
108.
109.
110.

MODEL ARTICLES, supra note 105, art. 15.
Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 14.
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leaves. Shares the worker purchases sometimes must be sold back to other workers on
departure.
In addition, where there are "enterprise shares," they involve another variation on
the shareholder relation. In theory these shares are owned by all participants, including
the workers. In practice, managers exercise the control rights, but in doing so, they
should in principle take account of employee interests. Dividends paid on "enterprise
shares" are divided within the enterprise among managers and employees.
Second, the practice of collective consumption remains securely institutionalized in
practice and rule. The Ministry's Model and local regulations require a fraction of aftertax profits to be remitted to a welfare fund for employee benefits. 111 This fraction of
after-tax benefits is commonly ten or twenty percent.
The ties between the enterprise and the community remain strong. Share ownership
remains concentrated within the community, usually entirely so. Regulations sometimes
restrict trading of shares outside the community. Government institutions hold large
blocks, and their receipts continue to fund collective benefits for residents. Lawful residence remains a de facto requirement for the better jobs.
Reinvestment. Provincial or local regulations typically mandate reinvestment of a
substantial portion of income. The Ministry suggests that sixty percent of annual income
should be devoted to "enlarging capital." 112 The Zhejiang requirement, which is more
typical, is forty percent.
Strikingly, such regulations typically mandate that a portion-the Ministry recommends half113--of retained earnings be committed to a "public accumulation" fund
that may never be distributed to shareholders or workers. In the event the enterprise has
no use for further capital or ceases to exist, the "public accumulation" fund is to be
spent on some community benefit or turned over to a collective institution providing
public benefits. Although anomalous in conventional corporate terms, this kind of
nonappropriable reserve is very much in the spirit of the notion of the collective. Members of a collective are entitled to share in the income of collective property, but they
have custody of the property in trust for the institution, including its future members,
and cannot therefore appropriate it individually.
IV. THE ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIALIST MARKET ENTERPRISE
How important and durable are the distinctive themes in the new enterprise laws?
Consider two views of the nonappropriable "public accumulation fund" prescribed in
the shareholding cooperative regulations of Wenzhou. Liu Wenpu of the Rural Development Institute in the Chinese Academy of Socialist Sciences, singles it out with approval as one of the distinctively "socialist elements" of a structure he describes as a "transition" to a more fully socialist economy. He suggests that it will endure while the more
conventionally capitalist elements of the structure wither away as the economy develops.114 On the other hand, Dong Fureng of the Economic Research Institute of the
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Liu Wenpu, Socialism and Peasant Property Ownership Rights, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 19, 22
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Chinese Academy of Social Science, complains that the funds suffer from "ambiguity
about property rights" and suggests that this is the type of feature likely to wither away
as enterprises evolve toward models standard in the West. 115 It is a reflection of the
current disjunction in China between general ideology and informal policy discourse
that, while Liu's view is clearly implied in the official doctrines of the leadership,
Dong's reflects the operating premises of most of the reforming cadres, managerial
professionals, and academics.
Certainly the moves toward corporatization represent steps toward more conventionally capitalist models. Nevertheless, there is a substantial probability that
corporatization will disappoint the articulated aspirations of its proponents, and there are
reasons to think that some of the conventionally capitalist elements of the corporate
enterprise structures will prove unstable. All that can be done here is to offer some
reasons for regarding the question as open.
A. Authority: Governance and Property Rights

To the extent that we take at face value the claim that Western corporate forms
have been adopted in order to "clarify property rights," the project seems misguided. In
fact, property rights in the 1980s structures were not distinctively unclear, and
corporatization is unlikely to clarify them further. 116 Sometimes the claim of lack of
clarity seems to be associated with organizational features that are clear enough, but are
anomalous by mainstream Western standards. In both the SOE and TVE structures of

(June 11, 1992).
115. Dong Fureng, Shareholding Cooperative Enterprise-Reform in Enterprise Organization Form, JPRS
Rep. China (JPRS), at 14-15 (Dec. 3, 1991).
116. There are at least two different ways to think about "clarity" of legal rights. First, we might understand clarity to imply rules that are fully specified ex ante. Such rules maximize clarity about how a decisionmaker will apply them in a given case, but since we do not know what circumstances future cases will involve, they do not necessarily maximize clarity about what the concrete effects of the decision will be for us.
A rule that says a majority can always mandate a merger is clear in the sense that we know how the judge
will decide if a merger has been approved by the majority. How it will affect us, though, depends on whether
we end up in the majority or the minority, and we may not be clear about that ex ante.
Second, we might understand clarity to mean a rule under which decisions tend strongly to correlate
with expectations. Rules that reflect this understanding may be minimally specified in advance. For example,
we might have a rule that says that a majority can mandate a merger "if it's fair." We are less clear about
exactly how a judge will apply this rule; on the other hand, we might feel more clear that we will be adequately protected under it.
American corporate law has generally (though not unifonnly) evolved toward the premise that the
second type of clarity is more important and, thus, toward acceptance of relatively unspecified norms of fair
treatment. Note, however, that it is misleading to speak of this type of nonn as "clarifying" rights. Such
nonns do not specify entitlements; they are parasitic on a pre-existing sense of entitlement. A general "fair
dealing" standard presupposes some pre-existing shared views of what is fair. Thus, arguably the quest for
clarity through legal reform is misguided. The first type of clarity may not be economically valuable; the
second is unattainable through rules.
Xun Yang, an economist in Liaoning University, makes an analogous point when he writes in an article
expressing skepticism about corporatization: "The shareholding system is not a premise for clarifying property
rights, it requires the clarity of property rights as its premise." Xun Yang, The Shnreholding System Cannot
Solve Operating Mechanism Problems Within State-Owned Enterprises, JPRS Rep. China (JPRS), at 7 (Oct.
15, 1992).
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the 1980s, managers and workers had strong control and income rights but relatively
weak capital rights. They had rights to substantial portions of enterprise income but
were obliged to preserve the capital for the benefit of some larger community. In the
SOEs (though not in the TVEs) this appears to have resulted in overstating income and
running down capital. The problem arose not from lack of clarity, but from difficulty of
enforcement of property rights, in this case the community's difficulty in enforcing its
asset rights. 117
Similarly, the problems of official interference and managerial abuse have more to
do with enforcement than definition of rights. In such instances, the real need is not for
better definition of property rights, but for the development of state capacity to enforce
public rights and citizen remedies for official abuse. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that many reformers prefer to talk about property rights reform as a way of avoiding more politically sensitive discussions of state structure reform.
Managers. As with the nomenclatura privatization in Eastern Europe, China's
enterprise reform has occasioned the looting of state assets by ex-cadres. On the other
hand, it seems possible that China may succeed in developing public enterprise structures that have better results in terms of both enterprise efficiency and distribution of
benefits. These results may be better than could have been achieved through broad scale
explicit privatization programs like the ones being tried in Eastern Europe.
The corporatization process and enterprise law have been largely peripheral to this
process and have been based on dubious analogies to corporatization in the West. The
main goal of the corporate form in the West was to facilitate participation in large-scale
enterprise of large numbers of dispersed investors. The two key moves were limited
liability and a control structure that allowed investors some hold over management but
left management a broad range of discretion over most business decisions.
These moves involved changes in property rights, not clarification of them. The
inauguration of limited liability involved a global transfer (or expropriation) of property
rights away from creditors to investors. The creation of the internal control structure
made available a form of conducting business that was not previously generally available. In each case, however, the prior regime-the rules of unlimited liability and the
unavailability of corporate control structures-was clear.
In the PRC, facilitating the participation of dispersed small investors is neither the
major articulated rationale for corporatization nor a likely practical effect. In the SOE
sector, the regime remains officially committed to public ownership, and despite the
occasionally articulated hopes of some reformers, it seems unlikely that dispersed individual shareholders could play a significant role in corporate governance. The public
share markets are not informationally efficient; the collective action problems that
plague shareholder monitoring in the West are at least as severe in China, and the rights
of individual minority shareholders remain weak and unclear even after the Company
Law.

117. The one important area where it seems appropriate to speak of unclear property rights is in connection with the capital rights in the TVE sector of individual founders of collective firms. Such individuals are
often considered to have capital rights. but absent corporatization, the extent of these rights is vague. While it
may be desirable to clarify such rights, there is no evidence that the absence of clarity has impeded development.
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In China, the practical goal of balancing state and managerial power does not involve, as it did in the West, facilitating participation by dispersed stakeholders. Rather,
it involves the narrowing of the participation of a single concentrated state stakeholder
(while maintaining effective checks against managerial abuse). For this purpose, Western enterprise models are not helpful for two reasons.
First, to the extent they limit state power at all, they do so in a categorical way
that constrains responsible supervisory efforts as much as corrupt ones. Any effort to
distinguish the two would probably require resort to difficult distinctions under fiduciary-type standards that would have the effect of making rights less clear (though perhaps
fairer and more efficient). Second, corporate statutes in fact do little to constrain shareholder power in the presence of concentrated holdings. The power to elect and remove
officers on short notice would usually be enough to compel managerial obedience over
decisions the law purports to leave to management.
In the TVE sector, the explicit arguments for corporatization seem insubstantial as
well. The interest in corporatization seems strongest in the areas with the most successful TVEs. As Weitzman and Xu point out, the success of these enterprises under ambiguous property regimes is powerful evidence that "clear" property rights are not vital to
development. This success also suggests that a substantial amount of official abuse and
corruption can be compatible with development.
Thus, it seems likely that the most important stakes in the corporatization proposals
are different from the ones explicitly advanced. On the one hand, managers in the SOE
sector like the symbolic and rhetorical associations of the corporate model with managerial independence and appeal to it to legitimate greater autonomy from state control. On
the other hand, especially in the TVE sector, popular concerns about political accountability of state officials are being sublimated into the much safer technocratic rhetoric
of economic efficiency.
Despite the irrelevance or ineffectuality of many aspects of the corporatization
project, China does appear to have at hand promising approaches to corporate monitoring. The first approach arises from the dispersion of public ownership among a variety
of institutions with significant independence from each other. If ownership could be
held in blocks large enough to provide incentives for monitoring but small enough to
impede the formation of looting or self-dealing coalitions, China might have the makings of the kind of institutional monitoring that appears to have been successful in Japan and about which American corporate theorists now dream.
Achieving such a system, recent scholarship suggests, depends less on enterprise or
company law and more on the rules that constitute the stakeholder institutions, presumably primarily (though not exclusively) intermediaries. While the Company Law could
certainly accommodate such a structure, arguably a model drawn more from partnership-with greater informality and stronger minority rights-would have been more
appropriate. Within the corporate structure, measures such as cumulative voting that
facilitate minority representation, which the Company Law does not provide, might be
desirable. Facilitating minority representation impedes the formation of predatory coalitions and makes it less likely that management can control the elections in the absence of a majority shareholder coalition.
The second approach is political democracy. In many respects, governance rights
are a substitute for private property rights. They have a stronger tendency than property
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rights to be unclear and to depend on post hoc assessment rather than ex ante specification, but as has been suggested, that is not necessarily a disadvantage. So instead of
protecting against official abuse by insulating enterprise management, a society could
try to do so by making officials more accountable to citizens generally. The current
state of debate on corporate governance is a reflection of the fact that Chinese leaders
are far more comfortable with capitalist economic institutions than with democracy.
Nevertheless, at least in the TYE sector, there may be reason to take seriously
democratic political solutions to problems that are more often treated as matters of
corporate governance. Beginning in 1987 with the passage of the national Organic Law
on Villagers' Committees and continuing with subsequent provincial legislation, there
have been efforts to give real power to village representative institutions and limit party
control of them. Implementation has been slow and erratic, but in some villages local
government has become a serious engine of official accountability. 118
Susan Lawrence recently reported on one such village in Hebei province. The concerns on which the Village Representative Assembly focused were precisely the types
of economic abuse on which the literature on enterprise reform has focused. Officials
run up excessive personal expenses ostensibly on public business; they give jobs to
unqualified friends and relatives; they cause enterprises to execute contracts with cronies; they walk off with property that belongs to the collective; and they exercise patently bad business judgments. The assembly Lawrence studied was able to get effective
redress for such misconduct, including reimbursement and return of property, discharge
of offending officials, and reversal of unfounded decisions. The people held accountable
included senior party leaders. 119
Workers. That the PRC legal structures express comparatively strong commitments
simultaneously to managerial power and to worker participation is only superficially
paradoxical. The explanation lies partly in the fact that participation usually does not
involve real control or democracy. The fact that the leadership continues to pay homage
to worker participation reflects both ideological continuity and ambivalence about basic
problems.
The attempt to combine managerial power and worker participation recalls the
principle of "democratic centralism" that was central to Maoism. 120 Centralism implied
control of policy by the Party elite. On the other hand, democracy implied implementation, but also participation in formulating policy, by small groups at the grass roots.
So conceived, "democracy" was a means of keeping the Party in touch with the
masses by surfacing information about grass roots sentiments and by enabling the Party
to recruit as cadres able people who demonstrated their abilities in small groups. Of
course, the small groups were also a means of keeping the masses in touch with the
Party by facilitating co-optation and monitoring. The most prominent participatory right
(which remains codified in the new enterprise laws) was the right to "criticize" elite
conduct. This right may have sometimes helped ordinary people redress grievances but

Kevin J. O'Brien, Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages, AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF., July
33-60.
Susan Lawrence, Democracy-Chinese Style, AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF., July 1994, at 61-70.
See Franz Schurmann, Organiz.ational Principles of the Chinese Communists, in CHINA UNDER MAO:
POLmcs TAKES COMMAND 87-98 (Roderick MacFarquhar ed., 1966).
118.
1994, at
119.
120.

302

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

often clearly helped officials identify deviants or (when manipulated and staged) punish
out-of-favor local leaders. Within the enterprise, the institutions of worker participation
(the trade union, the workers' congresses, small work groups) continue to play important roles in inducing worker consent to enterprise goals and surfacing information of
use to management. In comparison to the past, however, the goals and the information
are now less encompassing and political, more focused on productivity and economic
concems. 121
SOE workers and many resident TVE workers have strong enough informal claims
to membership in their enterprise that managers are constrained in using the dismissal
threat arbitrarily to motivate cooperation. Moreover, as enterprises strive to achieve
more flexibility in their production processes, they depend more on workers' skill and
initiative and a kind of performance not easily monitored. We know from studies of
industries elsewhere that such circumstances can motivate managers to allow more serious forms of worker participation. 122
In addition, we should take note of the most important "unclear" property right in
the Chinese enterprise system-the right of SOE workers to have their jobs protected, if
necessary, by subsidies to their enterprises. This "right" is unmentioned--even denied-in promulgated law, 123 but so far has been recognized significantly in practice
and is perceived by many as a critical constraint on policy. Unlike the managerial authority issue, this is an area where lack of clarity really does create problems.
On the one hand, the sense that there is such a right induces the kind of laxness
associated with soft budget constraints. On the other hand, the fact that the right is
vague and insecure leads to counter-productive behavior, such as an emphasis on shortterm gains (ranging from demands for higher compensation to outright looting of enterprise assets). Moreover, being unclear, the right is not transferable (as might be accomplished through an unemployment insurance system or retraining program), so the reallocation of labor from less efficient to more efficient enterprises is impeded. That the
effort to "clarify property rights" largely ignores this issue must be a reflection of political impasse.
Some reformers have entertained the idea that governance rights-serious worker
control-might substitute for property rights to subsidies. Workers given serious control
over the production process might see enterprise failure as a consequence of their own
decisions and hence more acceptable. This seems naive, stated so baldly. It is interesting, however, that in the few rural areas where workers were permitted to elect TVE
managers, some officials explain the practice as a way of making workers feel more
responsible for performance and more willing to accept the consequences of failure. 124
The salience of democratic centralism was in part a reflection of the fact that the
Chinese Communist dictatorship has always taken a relatively nonbureaucratic form; it
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See WALDER, supra note 33, at 222-41.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: PoSSIBil.ITIES
FOR PROSPERITY 133-64 (1985).
123. The Labor Law gives workers with 10 years seniority tenure in the enterprise. Labor Law, supra
note 35, art. 20. But the Enterprise Law denies that there is any right to subsidization of the enterprise. Enterprise Law, supra note 13, art 2.
124. RURAL INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 380.
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has tended to be relatively informal and personalistic. This style of organization seeks
to enlist cooperation and initiative through controlled participation. But the more ambitious its efforts to secure cooperation and initiative, the more risk that participation will
escape the bounds of control. Thus, one should not discount the possibility that the
participatory forms the law provides perfunctorily might someday be meaningfully
exercised.

B. Exit Constraints and Enterprise Form
Weitzman and Xu explain the success of TVEs without the benefit of clear property rights as a function of high-trust, collaborative dispositions, which they treat as a
matter of culture. Although this could be right, institutions that are themselves creatures
of deliberate policy choices are also an important part of the explanation. Certainly the
recent explosion in China of both entrepreneurialism and corruption, and various
noneconomic forms of self-assertion, raises some questions about the stereotype of Chinese culture as fundamentally more cooperative than others. On the other hand, it seems
undeniable that there are important institutional structures in the rural sector that create
strong expectations of repeated dealings among potential collaborators and powerful
collective incentives for collaboration.
The membership and reinvestment themes in the legal structures of the SOEs and
TVEs are small-scale instances of a broad set of policies to restrain capital and labor
mobility. This policy represents a point of continuity between the Maoist and reform
eras. Although China's product markets have been as fully marketized as those of many
capitalist economies, its labor and capital markets remain highly constrained.
The household registration system continues to make migration from one's place of
birth difficult. The capital market is dominated by the People's Bank of China and its
affiliates, which have a monopoly over formal banking. Though stock markets and a
variety of intermediaries have emerged, their roles remain limited. In these circumstances, capital tends to be relatively immobile both because the branch offices of the official
banking system are sensitive to local political interests opposed to capital migration and
because, in the absence of a fully developed national system of intermediation, people
are compelled to rely on internal finance. 125
These policies are in some respects echoes of the Maoist idea of "self-reliance."126 If "democratic centralism" was an effort to achieve dictatorship without bureaucracy, "self-reliance" was an effort to achieve economic decentralization without
markets. The Maoist vision prescribed strongly encompassing local communities with
minimal exit and entry and largely internal finance. In a way that has some resemblances to the contemporary "flexible specialization" theme, it sought to foster economic
diversification and the development of general skills. This rhetoric seems discredited

125. Ronald McKinnon argues that it is desirable in the early stages of economic liberalization to rely
strongly on internal enterprise finance. He suggests this is necessary to harden the budget constraints of the
state enterprises and curb the inflationary potential of lax credit. He also suggests that in the early stage, the
formerly socialist banking system is unlikely to have the skills of credit evaluation needed to prudently play a
major role in enterprise finance. RONALD MCKINNON, THE ORDER OF EcONOMJC LIBERALIZATION 6-8, 12061, 187-216 (2d ed. 1993).
126. See CARL RISKIN, CHINA'S PoLmCAL ECONOMY 11-37 (1987).
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now even in China because of its association with the catastrophes of the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but it in fact seems consistent with many aspects
of successful current practice. Moreover, Philip Huang has suggested that the muchmaligned Maoist effort at rural industrialization provided the initial basis for the TVEs.
The TVEs started out with capital that might not have accumulated at the township and
village (commune and brigade) level but for the Maoist industrialization efforts. And a
large number of prosperous TVEs trace their origins back before the reforms to the
Maoist era. 127
The "self-reliance" idea appears at the level of the firm in both the Communist
notion of collective ownership and those of various forms of market socialism, including those of Proudhon and his disciples, the American Farmers' Alliance, and pre-1988
Yugoslavia. 128 A basic idea is to trade ease of "exit" for opportunities for "voice" or
participation. Individuals who cannot easily withdraw from an enterprise are more likely
to struggle to improve it through participation, at least if they are likely to benefit from
improvement. An economic interest in the enterprise that cannot be transferred or liquidated potentially penalizes exit and gives the holder incentives to participate productively. The paradigmatic form of this type of interest is a nonappropriable capital stake
conditional on membership, such as the "public accumulation fund" in the shareholding
cooperative regulations. The participants benefit from the stake during their tenure but
cannot liquidate it or carry it with them on departure. Employment benefits in excess of
the worker's alternative employment opportunities function in a similar way. Personal
satisfactions associated with fulfilling membership in a community do so as well. There
is both a political and an economic logic here that has been rediscovered recently in
various fields outside the socialist world. The political logic is that local self-governance and workplace democracy requires that participants have a kind of property interest that links their personal fortunes to the fate of the community.
The economic logic is that certain valuable long-term investments require that firm
and worker bond to each other. In particular, if the worker is to invest in the acquisition
of skills distinctively valuable within the firm or if the firm is to invest in the worker's
acquisition of skills that would also have value elsewhere, then the worker needs assurances of tenure or the firm needs assurances that the worker will remain for the longterm. Such investments are especially important when firms adopt the mode of "flexible
specialization" that aims to produce a changing array of at least moderately sophisticated products with general purpose technology. Zheyuen Cui suggests that many TVEs fit
the "flexible specialization" model well. 129 Ministry of Agriculture officials indicated
to me that long-term incentives for investments in skill acquisition have been an important consideration in the design of TYE enterprise structure.
The type of enterprise organization with illiquid long-term relations and internal
finance seems to complement important practical features of the Chinese economy,
particularly the limited development of labor and capital markets. One might anticipate
that labor and capital markets will gradually liberalize to resemble conventional Western

127. PHILIP HUANG, THE PEASANT FAMILY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THEY ANGZI DELTA 1350-1988
253-87 (1990).
128. See generally Simon, supra note 43.
129. Cui, supra note 56.
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ones, and that the distinctive features of enterprise structure will then erode. Nevertheless, an important measure of constraint on labor and capital mobility may prove to be a
relatively enduring feature of Chinese society.
It is widely believed that a strong and immediate liberalization of labor and capital
markets would prompt massive migrations of labor and capital from country to city,
north to south, and interior to coast. Common belief also holds that this migration
would be costly both in terms of the loss of personally satisfying and potentially productive relations in the areas that would lose population and crowding externalities
(overuse of public goods) and social control problems in the receiving areas. Constraints
on capital and labor movement, in particular movement out of the rural and interior
areas, are thought necessary in order to avoid these costs.
Some believe that if movement of capital into undeveloped areas could be induced,
constraints on labor outmigration would be unnecessary. However, it is far from clear
that a market-based national financial system in a relatively under-developed country is
capable of identifying efficiently viable investment opportunities in less developed rural
areas. 130 Thus, some combination of capital and labor controls may continue to seem
necessary.
In this context, the membership and reinvestment aspects of the TYE structure may
be valued as constraints on capital and labor migration. These constraints are likely to
be seen as considerably less coercive than those of the household registration system,
and at some stages of development, might become a plausible alternative to them.
Of course in the long run, one could imagine China developing toward fully liberalized labor and capital markets. Would the distinctive "socialist market" aspects of its
enterprise structures survive then? It is hard to say, but it is certainly possible. There
are some examples of comparable structures that are currently successful in advanced
capitalist environments-the industrial cooperative networks of north central Italy, for
example. If China develops through a path that induces these characteristics in the
short-term, they might prove viable in the long run, even though alternative paths would
also have been viable.
V. CONCLUSION

The Chinese "socialist market" enterprise is socialist in more than name. It involves extensive public ownership and three themes that link it structurally and functionally to pre-reform ideologies and structures-a simultaneous commitment to
managerialism with worker control, a definition of ownership in terms of community
membership, and strong reinvestment commitments. These characteristics remain strong
even in corporatized enterprises. The stakes involved in corporatization seem more symbolic and ideological than practical. Corporatization is unlikely to solve either the problems invoked to support it or the deeper political concerns that seem to motivate some
of its proponents.

130. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, RICH LANDS AND POOR 27-29 (1957); Thomas Hellman et al., Financial Restraint: Towards a New Paradigm (Feb. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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The distinctive characteristics of the "socialist market" enterprise are strongly
linked both to long-standing characteristics of Chinese organizational and economic life.
The key organizational characteristics are informal hierarchy and controlled rank-andfile mobilization. The key economic characteristics are constraints on labor and capital
mobility. The durability of the distinctive "Chinese characteristics" of the current SOEs
and TVEs will depend on the development of these broader conditions. They could well
erode in favor of institutions with a more thorough going resemblance to those in the
mainstream West, but alternative logics of political and economic development make it
possible as well that the distinctive features could remain important defining features of
the Chinese enterprise.

